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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis investigates two research questions: 1) whether acquiring firms win or lose 
in the cross-border M&As in Asia; and 2) what are the factors that influence acquirer 
performance.  
Answering the call for understanding the performance of M&As undertaken 
outside U.S. or Europe, I use the standard event-study approach to examine stock 
returns to those acquiring firms taking over Asian targets. Further, to explore the 
factors influencing acquirer performance, I adopt the following underlying logic. 
Performance of M&As on the stock market depends upon market’s valuation of the 
net present value (NPV) of M&A transactions. As the NPV of an M&A is decided by 
two parts, value created by the transaction and the cost of this investment, I transform 
the research question into identifying the factors that influence the realization of value 
creation and the factors that determine the investment cost of an M&A transaction.  
In M&As, value creation is a process which involves combining and making 
optimal use of two merging firms’ specialized resources (technology, production, 
marketing, finance, human resource, etc.). Therefore, I expect that the achievement of 
value creation is highly related to two factors: 1) resources that are productive and 
transferable within the M&A; and 2) the conditions for combination and 
reconfiguration of such resources. Accordingly, I predict that stock market 
performance of the acquiring firm in an M&A would be influenced by acquirer’s 
ownership advantages, business relatedness between acquiring and target firm, and 
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the interaction between business relatedness and ownership advantages.   
Cost of M&A is the other side of the coin. An M&A investment can be 
considered as a process involving searching and valuing targets, negotiation, 
execution and integration; accordingly, I break the cost of such investment into three 
parts: searching and valuing cost, negotiation cost and premium paid, and integration 
cost. I expect that liabilities of foreignness increase M&A cost, while prior M&A 
experience could help the acquiring firms to save the time, effort, money, or other 
resources involved in M&A activities, which in turn reduces the M&A cost. 
I test my five hypotheses by using a sample of 314 cross-border acquisitions 
undertaken during 1985-1999, 57% of which was conducted during 1997-1999. These 
314 international transactions were made by 246 acquiring firms from the U.S., Hong 
Kong and Singapore. The U.S. firms seem to be the most active acquirer in my 
sample; more than half (60.83%) of the transactions were conducted by firms from 
the United States. On the target side, the 314 transactions cover 11 Asian countries, of 
which China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore had aggregately received 69.11% 
of the total investment. Further, the data also indicates that Hong Kong, China and 
South Korea are the most popular destinations for FDI in the sectors of electronic 
equipment, chemical, printing and etc. U.S. acquirers appear to be more interested in 
conducting related M&As than their Asian counterparts.  
The Patell Z tests in this study show that on average, acquirers earn insignificant 
abnormal returns from cross-border M&As in Asia. Z Tests on the subsamples of 
acquirers from different origins find that only the shareholders of U.S. acquiring firms 
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enjoy significant, but small positive excess returns from the acquisition; but no 
significant abnormal returns are found among Asian acquirers. 
The results for OLS regressions support part of the hypotheses. Specifically, 
acquiring firms with superior intangible assets would enjoy better performance; 
related M&As could generate more benefits than unrelated M&As for acquirers; and 
there exists a significant U-shape relationship between acquirer performance and 
acquisition experience. On the other hand, the positive effect of intangible assets on 
acquirer performance seems to be weakened in related M&As. In addition, the study 
does not find a significant relationship between acquirer performance and acquirer’s 
knowledge of the target.  
Combining the empirical results with theoretical arguments, I discuss 
explanations for the unexpected findings and interpretations for the supported results. 
Potential improvement in both theoretical and empirical aspects is also addressed. 
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Table 2-1 Selected Results for Outcome Studies 





1964-1972 U.K. 233 acquiring firms Loss in ROA 
Hoshino  
(1982) 
1967-1973 Japan 90 acquisitions 







Loss in market 
share and rate of 
ROE 
Ravenscraft & Scherer 
(1987) 
1950-1977 U.S. 456 acquiring firms 
Loss in pre-tax 
ROA 
Lang et al.  
(1989) 
1968-1986 U.S. 87 tender offers Tobin’s q: -12%
Cosh et al.  
(1989) 
1981-1983 U.K. 59 acquisitions 
Loss in ROA; 
slow growth 
 
Table 2-2 Selected Results for Event Studies 
Study Time Period Sample Event Window 
Acquirer 
Performance 
Asquith (1983) 1962-1976 
196 acquiring 
firms 
(d= -1,0) 0.20% 
Asquith et al. (1983) 1963-1979 214 merger bids (d= -20, 0) 2.8% * 
Bradley et al. (1988) 1963-1968 53 tender offers (d= -5,+5) 4.09% * 





(y=+1, +5) - 24.2% * 
Megginson et al. 
(2000) 
1977-1996 204 acquisitions (y=+1, +3) - 13% * 
* significant at 10% 
 
Table 2-3 Selected Results for Event Studies on Asia Countries 
Study Time Period Sample Event Window 
Acquirer 
Performance 
Ding et al. (1996) 1975-1995 
23 acquiring 
firms 
(d=-5, 0) 0.66% 
Lee et al.  
(1997) 
1983-1992 39 takeovers (y=-1,+1) 30% * 
Pangarkar and Junius  
(2004) 
1990-1999 115 acquisitions (d=-9, +1) 2.1% * 
* significant at 10% 
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Table 3-1 Benefits, Resources, and Different Types of M&As 
 Related M&As Unrelated M&As 
Potential Benefits 
Market Power; 
Economies of Scale / Scope 
Internal Capital Market; 
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Table 4-1 Crosstab by SIC and target nation – Entire Sample 
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Table 4-2 Crosstab by Industry and Target Nation – Hong Kong Acquirer 
Industry CHN INS MAC MAL PH TW TH TOTAL (%)
Mineral  1       1 1.61
Construction  2   1    3 4.84




6       6 9.68
Wholesale Trade    1  1  2 3.23




9  1 1  1 1 13 20.97
Service Industries 10   1 1 1 2 15 24.19
Public 
Administration 
1       1 1.61
TOTAL 48 1 1 4 1 4 3 62 100




Table 4-3 Crosstab by Industry and Target Nation – Singapore Acquirer 
Industry CHN HK INS MAC MAL PH TW TH TOTAL (%)
Mineral 1        1 1.64
Construction 1 2       3 4.92




1  1  1    3 4.92
Wholesale 
Trade 
1 1  1 4    7 11.48




2 3 1  3 2   11 18.03
Service 
Industries 
4 1   3 1   9 14.75
Public 
Administration 
        0 0 
TOTAL 14 12 4 1 24 3 1 2 61 100
(%) 22.95 19.67 6.56 1.64 39.34 4.92 1.64 3.28 100  
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Table 4-4 Crosstab by Industry and Target Nation – Asia Acquirer 
Industry CHN HK INS MAC MAL PH TW TH TOTAL (%)
Mineral  2        2 1.63
Construction  3 2   1    6 4.88




7  1  1    9 7.32
Wholesale Trade 1 1  1 5  1  9 7.32




11 3 1 1 4 2 1 1 24 19.51
Service 
Industries 
14 1   4 2 1 2 24 19.51
Public 
Administration 
1        1 0.81
TOTAL 62 12 5 2 28 4 5 5 123 100
(%) 50.41 9.76 4.07 1.63 22.76 3.52 4.07 4.07 100  
 
 
Table 4-5 Crosstab by Industry and Target Nation – U.S. Acquirer 
Industry CHN HK INS MA PH SG SK TW TH VT TTL (%)
Mineral 2 1 2 1  3    1 10 5.24
Construction   1        1 0.52




1 4 1 2  4 4 1   17 8.90
Wholesale Trade 3 8  2  2  4   19 9.95




 2 1  2 1   3  9 4.71
Service 
Industries 
1 11   1 7 1 3 2  26 13.61
Public 
Administration 
   1       1 0.52
TOTAL 17 55 10 13 4 30 26 20 14 2 191 100
(%) 8.9 28.8 5.24 6.81 2.09 1.57 1.36 10.47 7.33 1.05 100  
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Table 4-6 Hypotheses, Key Constructs & Measures for Variables 
Hypothesis Key Construct Measures 
H1 
Ownership Advantage  
-> High Performance 
Performance:  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Ownership Advantage: 
Intensity of intangible assets (IA/TA) 
Intensity of R&D expenses (RD/TA) (US 
subsample only) 
Intensity of advertising expenses (ADV/TA ) (US 
subsample only) 
H2 
Relatedness -> High 
Performance 
REL is coded as 1 when acquirer and target are 
operating in related sectors based on analysis of 
the business description of the 4-dig SIC codes, 
otherwise coded as 0. 
H3 
Ownership Advantages in 
related M&As -> High 
Performance 
Interaction factor: 
Interaction_1 = (IA/TA) * (REL) 
Interaction_2 = (RD/TA) * (REL) (US 
subsample only) 
Interaction_3 = (ADV/TA) * (REL) (US 
subsample only) 
H4 
Acquirer’s knowledge about 
-> Low Performance 
Knowledge about target: 
1) INS_1 coded as 1 if acquirer holds equity 
shares prior to the M&A, otherwise coded 
as 0. 
2) INS_2 is coded as 1 if the acquirer holds
more than 10%, otherwise it is coded as 0. 
 
H5 
Prior M&A experience  
-> High performance 
Prior M&A experience: 
1) Number of M&As undertaken prior to the 
focal transaction 
2) Squared term of 1) 
3) Logarithm of the measure 1) 
4) Squared term of 3) 
5) length of months between the focal 
transaction and the first transaction 
6) length of years between the focal 
transaction and the first transaction 
7) a dummy coded as 1 if acquirer has 
undertaken M&A previously, otherwise 
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CARs(-20,+1) -0.5136 1.0404 0.0047 0.1466 
OWNERSHIP 
ADVANTAGE (IA/TA) 
0 0.5946 0.0931 0.1122 
RELATED 0 1 0.64 0.48 
UNRELATED 0 1 0.36 0.48 
HORIZONTAL 0 1 0.52 0.50 
VERTICAL 0 1 0.12 0.33 
SAME BUSINESS 0 1 0.28 0.45 
SIMILAR PRODUCTION 0 1 0.20 0.40 
SIMILAR CUSTOMER 0 1 0.04 0.184 
SIMILAR TECHNOLOGY 0 1 0.01 0.08 
BUYING A SUPPLIER 0 1 0.06 0.245 









EXPERIENCE (ln) 0 2.0794 0.2509 0.4404 
EXP_2 (SQUARED 
TERM) 
0 4.3241 0.2563 0.5781 
PAYMENT MODE 0 1 0.09 0.29 
PRIVATELY 
NEGOTIATED 
0 1 0.02 0.148 
SIZE (ln) 1.2986 18.4804 9.6134 3.7523 
CASH FLOW 0 0.7208 0.0878 0.1115 
LIABILITIES 0 0.9236 0.1394 0.1447 
PRE-ACQ 
PROFITABILITY 
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Table 5-1 Average cumulative abnormal returns and Patell Z scores 
 Hong Kong Singapore U.S. Asia Total 
ACARs -1.29% 0.25% 1.12% -0.60% 0.48% 
Z -0.16 0.04 1.89* -0.07 1.17 
* significant at 10% 
 
 
Table 5-2 Entire Sample, Dependent Variable: CARs (-20, +1) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Independent Variable 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
OWNERSHIP 
ADVANTAGE  
0.341 2.594** 0.340 2.582** 0.356 2.701***
RELATED  0.038 1.756*     
HORIZONTAL   0.039 1.760*   
VERTICAL   0.034 1.085   
SAME BUSINESS     0.039 1.549 
SIMILAR PROD     0.035 1.332 
SIMILAR CUSM     0.057 1.131 
SIMILAR TECH     0.304 2.673***
BUY SUPPLIER     0.037 0.965 
BUY BUYER     0.032 0.778 
RELATED*OWNERSHIP 
ADVANTAGE 
-0.501 -3.160*** -0.500 -3.149*** -0.517 -3.238***
KNOWLEDGE OF TGT -0.024 -0.958 -0.024 -0.951 -0.020 -0.808 
EXPERIENCE  -0.109 -2.077** -0.109 -2.079** -0.117 -2.220** 
SQUARED EXP 0.113 2.880*** 0.114 2.883*** 0.118 2.953***
PAYMENT -0.011 -0.359 -0.011 -0.368 -0.019 -0.600 
NEGOTIATED -0.013 -0.212 -0.013 -0.206 -0.004 -0.063 
SIZE -0.005 -1.769* -0.005 -1.772* -0.005 -1.607 
CASH FLOW -0.111 -1.333 -0.111 -1.329 -0.122 -1.447 
LIABILITIES 0.038 0.600 0.038 0.600 0.040 0.630 
PROFITABILITY 0.043 1.900* 0.043 1.889* 0.048 2.103** 
YEAR1985 -0.045 -0.448 -0.044 -0.445 -0.064 -0.637 
YEAR1986 0.007 0.082 0.006 0.068 -0.010 -0.112 
YEAR1987 0.049 0.522 0.048 0.514 0.034 0.365 
YEAR1988 -0.245 -2.132** -0.246 -2.138** -0.264 -2.289** 
YEAR1989 -0.059 -0.652 -0.061 -0.663 -0.084 -0.916 
YEAR1990 0.006 0.062 0.006 0.062 -0.010 -0.109 
YEAR1991 -0.115 -1.535 -0.115 -1.536 -0.168 -2.163** 
YEAR1992 0.058 0.883 0.058 0.884 0.040 0.618 
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Table 5-2 Entire Sample, Dependent Variable: CARs (-20, +1) – Cont’d 
YEAR1993 -0.017 -0.258 -0.017 -0.266 -0.050 -0.764 
YEAR1994 -0.023 -0.350 -0.023 -0.349 -0.043 -0.654 
YEAR1995 -0.029 -0.478 -0.030 -0.492 -0.050 -0.808 
YEAR1996 -0.038 -0.671 -0.039 -0.680 -0.058 -0.998 
YEAR1997 0.007 0.129 0.007 0.122 -0.012 -0.209 
YEAR1998 -0.012 -0.211 -0.013 -0.221 -0.031 -0.533 
YEAR1999 -0.059 -1.011 -0.060 -1.020 -0.077 -1.297 
TGT NAT_HK 0.066 1.652* 0.067 1.662* 0.084 2.062** 
TGT NAT_MA 0.058 1.372 0.059 1.385 0.075 1.736* 
TGT NAT_SG 0.039 0.881 0.040 0.897 0.058 1.278 
TGT NAT_CN 0.087 2.129** 0.088 2.136** 0.103 2.478** 
TGT NAT_ID 0.108 2.117** 0.109 2.118** 0.109 2.124** 
TGT NAT_MC 0.012 0.108 0.012 0.110 0.041 0.315 
TGT NAT_PH 0.054 0.844 0.055 0.848 0.070 1.089 
TGT NAT_SK 0.027 0.602 0.028 0.614 0.041 0.895 
TGT NAT_TW 0.047 1.006 0.048 1.021 0.065 1.385 
TGT NAT_VT -0.018 -0.165 -0.016 -0.144 -0.0001 -0.001 
R Square 0.151 0.151 0.169 
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 5-3 Asia, Dependent Variable: CARs (-20, +1) 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Independent Variable 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
OWNERSHIP 
ADVANTAGE 
0.574 1.277 0.566 1.254 0.551 1.185 
RELATED  0.079 2.731*     
HORIZONTAL   0.084 2.776***   
VERTICAL   0.054 1.041   
SAME BUSINESS     0.070 1.792* 
SIMILAR PROD     0.091 2.176**
SIMILAR CUSM     0.130 1.621 
BUY SUPPLIER     0.055 0.991 
BUY BUYER     0.045 0.432 
RELATED* OWNERSHIP 
ADVANTAGE 
-1.412 -1.413 -1.259 1.214 -1.217 -1.126 
KNOWLEDGE OF TGT 0.015 0.367 0.019 0.470 0.022 0.509 
EXPERIENCE  -0.112 -1.090 -0.097 -0.915 -0.093 -0.855 
SQUARED EXP 0.081 0.914 0.068 0.747 0.067 0.715 
PAYMENT 0.003 0.065 0.002 0.035 0.004 0.092 
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Table 5-3 Asia, Dependent Variable: CARs (-20, +1) – Cont’d 
NEGOTIATED -0.021 -0.235 -0.023 -0.254 -0.017 -0.185 
SIZE -0.006 -0.541 -0.006 -0.578 -0.006 -0.562 
CASH FLOW -0.061 -0.494 -0.061 -0.491 -0.047 -0.358 
LIABILITIES 0.107 0.823 0.104 0.795 0.128 0.932 
PROFITABILITY 0.056 2.013** 0.056 1.992** 0.055 1.921** 
YEAR1989 -0.049 -0.203 -0.061 -0.249 -0.046 -0.183 
YEAR1990 -0.167 -0.678 -0.141 -0.559 -0.140 -0.537 
YEAR1991 -0.233 -1.176 -0.236 -1.189 -0.231 -1.143 
YEAR1992 -0.052 -0.307 -0.052 -0.306 -0.051 -0.296 
YEAR1993 -0.044 -0.234 -0.046 -0.246 -0.038 -0.201 
YEAR1994 -0.114 -0.624 -0.119 -0.649 -0.121 -0.648 
YEAR1995 -0.040 -0.199 -0.042 -0.208 -0.045 -0.218 
YEAR1996 -0.057 -0.323 -0.059 -0.331 -0.058 -0.318 
YEAR1997 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.009 0.003 -0.015 
YEAR1998 -0.074 -0.403 -0.078 -0.422 -0.080 -0.425 
YEAR1999 -0.077 -0.395 -0.078 -0.397 -0.078 -0.389 
TGT NAT_HK 0.085 0.954 0.092 1.019 0.085 0.906 
TGT NAT_MA 0.061 0.704 0.068 0.773 0.060 0.647 
TGT NAT_CN 0.100 1.196 0.108 1.266 0.102 1.156 
TGT NAT_ID 0.078 0.785 0.083 0.826 0.078 0.762 
TGT NAT_MC 0.071 0.505 0.077 0.544 0.076 0.532 
TGT NAT_PH 0.012 0.110 0.012 0.114 0.012 0.110 
TGT NAT_TW 0.087 0.869 0.097 0.951 0.083 0.781 
R Square 0.222 0.225 0.230 
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 5-4 US, Dependent Variable: CARs (-20, +1) 
- Ownership advantage measured by R&D, Advertising expenditure 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Independent Variable 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
RD/TA -1.223 -2.115** -1.210 -2.090** -1.242 -2.141** 
ADV/TA -0.977 -1.610 -0.973 -1.600 -0.856 -1.405 
RELATED -0.073 -2.152**     
HORIZONTAL   -0.066 -1.901*   
VERTICAL   -0.095 -2.179**   
SAME BUSINESS     -0.061 -1.578 
SIMILAR PROD     -0.073 -1.873* 
SIMILAR CUSM     -0.111 -1.600 
SIMILAR TECH     0.175 1.375 
BUY SUPPLIER     -0.118 -2.050** 
BUY BUYER     -0.082 -1.584 
RELATED*RD 1.086 1.818** 1.051 1.752* 1.088 1.815* 
  - K - 
Table 5-4 US, Dependent Variable: CARs (-20, +1) – Cont’d 
- Ownership advantage measured by R&D, Advertising expenditure 
RELATED*ADV 0.577 0.866 0.558 0.834 0.419 0.622 
KNOWLEDGE OF TGT -0.046 -1.355 -0.046 -1.372 -0.046 -1.341 
EXPERIENCE  -0.085 -1.215 -0.092 -1.311 -0.106 -1.477 
SQUARED EXP 0.099 2.056** 0.107 2.168** 0.116 2.303** 
PAYMENT -0.027 -0.576 -0.030 -0.646 -0.041 -0.874 
NEGOTIATED 0.019 0.135 0.018 0.132 0.030 0.213 
SIZE -0.005 -0.860 -0.005 -0.878 -0.005 -0.831 
CASH FLOW -0.096 -0.695 -0.093 -0.671 -0.113 -0.814 
LIABILITIES -0.014 -0.164 -0.014 -0.170 -0.020 -0.235 
PROFITABILITY 0.145 0.993 0.143 0.983 0.148 1.014 
YEAR1985 0.090 0.787 0.094 0.819 0.076 0.657 
YEAR1986 0.102 0.972 0.097 0.923 0.090 0.843 
YEAR1987 0.104 0.968 0.101 0.937 0.095 0.875 
YEAR1988 -0.136 -1.084 -0.143 -1.136 -0.154 -1.215 
YEAR1989 -0.014 -0.115 -0.015 -0.124 -0.030 -0.242 
YEAR1990 0.148 1.373 0.143 1.322 0.139 1.286 
YEAR1991 0.066 0.741 0.067 0.754 0.016 0.170 
YEAR1992 0.239 2.732*** 0.243 2.774*** 0.236 2.664***
YEAR1993 0.122 1.328 0.117 1.277 0.065 0.678 
YEAR1994 0.152 1.637 0.163 1.732* 0.162 1.686* 
YEAR1995 0.084 1.076 0.081 1.028 0.071 0.897 
YEAR1996 0.058 0.800 0.057 0.779 0.062 0.827 
YEAR1997 0.093 1.235 0.093 1.221 0.085 1.119 
YEAR1998 0.123 1.654* 0.123 1.655* 0.118 1.572 
YEAR1999 0.077 1.034 0.075 1.004 0.072 0.955 
TGT NAT_HK 0.030 0.622 0.030 0.628 0.042 0.849 
TGT NAT_MA 0.061 0.986 0.065 1.043 0.075 1.184 
TGT NAT_SG 0.024 0.469 0.027 0.533 0.037 0.714 
TGT NAT_CN 0.058 1.037 0.059 1.043 0.073 1.279 
TGT NAT_ID 0.095 1.461 0.095 1.459 0.079 1.194 
TGT NAT_PH 0.053 0.552 0.057 0.593 0.074 0.769 
TGT NAT_SK 0.029 0.544 0.029 0.559 0.034 0.640 
TGT NAT_TW 0.018 0.323 0.022 0.383 0.035 0.596 
TGT NAT_VT -0.059 -0.494 -0.054 -0.452 -0.038 -0.307 
R Square 0.245 0.248 0.271 
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Table 5-5 US, Dependent Variable: CARs (-20, +1)  
– Ownership advantage measured by intangible assets 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Independent Variable 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
IA/TA  0.024 0.102 0.022 0.094 0.054 0.225 
RELATED  -0.038 -0.771     
HORIZONTAL   -0.034 -0.674   
VERTICAL   -0.059 -1.016   
SAME BUSINESS     -0.027 -0.523 
SIMILAR PROD     -0.039 -0.729 
SIMILAR CUSM     -0.061 -0.762 
SIMILAR TECH     0.233 1.701* 
BUY SUPPLIER     -0.072 -1.044 
BUY BUYER     -0.048 -0.747 
RELATED*IA 0.018 0.065 0.018 0.065 -0.008 -0.029 
KNOWLEDGE OF TGT -0.033 -0.959 -0.034 -0.975 -0.032 -0.907 
EXPERIENCE  -0.095 -1.351 -0.101 -1.423 -0.112 -1.557 
SQUARED EXP 0.111 2.263** 0.117 2.346** 0.125 2.435**
PAYMENT -0.033 -0.691 -0.035 -0.746 -0.048 -1.017 
NEGOTIATED 0.064 0.453 0.064 0.452 0.079 0.555 
SIZE -0.007 -1.159 -0.007 -1.177 -0.007 -1.115 
CASH FLOW -0.143 -1.087 -0.144 -1.093 -0.161 -1.224 
LIABILITIES 0.026 0.304 0.027 0.315 0.024 0.276 
PROFITABILITY 0.144 0.961 0.143 0.954 0.144 0.961 
YEAR1985 0.061 0.500 0.065 0.531 0.041 0.333 
YEAR1986 0.084 0.754 0.081 0.724 0.066 0.579 
YEAR1987 0.089 0.813 0.086 0.786 0.073 0.661 
YEAR1988 -0.145 -1.080 -0.150 -1.116 -0.167 -1.239 
YEAR1989 -0.038 -0.294 -0.038 -0.298 -0.061 -0.470 
YEAR1990 0.136 1.175 0.132 1.141 0.121 1.036 
YEAR1991 0.026 0.247 0.028 0.266 -0.035 -0.321 
YEAR1992 0.197 2.080** 0.201 2.114** 0.184 1.920* 
YEAR1993 0.091 0.896 0.088 0.869 0.026 0.240 
YEAR1994 0.128 1.287 0.138 1.367 0.127 1.240 
YEAR1995 0.054 0.635 0.052 0.611 0.034 0.392 
YEAR1996 0.024 0.295 0.023 0.292 0.018 0.218 
YEAR1997 0.065 0.766 0.064 0.764 0.050 0.590 
YEAR1998 0.096 1.154 0.097 1.164 0.085 1.005 
YEAR1999 0.039 0.463 0.038 0.451 0.025 0.294 
TGT NAT_HK 0.017 0.320 0.017 0.325 0.033 0.608 
TGT NAT_MA 0.054 0.833 0.057 0.882 0.070 1.064 
TGT NAT_SG 0.016 0.308 0.019 0.360 0.034 1.626 
TGT NAT_CN 0.042 0.722 0.043 0.732 0.061 1.030 
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Table 5-5 US, Dependent Variable: CARs (-20, +1)  
– Ownership advantage measured by intangible assets 
TGT NAT_ID 0.096 1.411 0.096 1.409 0.083 1.209 
TGT NAT_PH 0.052 0.537 0.056 0.575 0.081 0.835 
TGT NAT_SK 0.008 0.138 0.008 0.150 0.017 0.315 
TGT NAT_TW -0.002 -0.029 0.002 0.026 0.020 0.318 
TGT NAT_VT -0.083 -0.669 -0.016 -0.144 -0.063 -0.494 
R Square 0.196 0.198 0.223 




Table 5-5 Summary of Hypotheses and Findings – Entire Sample 
Hypothesis Finding 
H1: Acquirer performance is positively related to the quantity of 
intangible assets possessed prior to the acquisition. 
Supported 
H2: Both related and unrelated M&As generate positive gains to the 
acquiring firms. 
Partially supported
H3: Acquirer performance is positively related to the interaction of 
the quantity and relatedness of intangible assets possessed prior to 
the acquisition. 
Contradictory 
H4: Acquirer performance is positively related to the level of 
acquirer’s knowledge about the target firm prior to the acquisition. 
Insignificant 
H5: Acquirer performance is positively related to its prior 
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Figure 4-2 The Comparison on the frequency of related and unrelated M&As across 
Acquirers from the Three Countries (Hong Kong, Singapore and U.S.)  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The dramatic changes in the world business environment – new technologies, reforms 
to regulatory frameworks, and the continued development of capital markets – have 
presented firms with many new business opportunities, and risks as well. In response 
to such a changing environment, many firms have undertaken cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) to defend and enhance their competitive positions. 
Cross-border M&As can enable firms to quickly build and employ assets in different 
countries. Cross-border M&As can also create a new platform for firms to restructure 
their existing operations globally to exploit economies of scale / scope and obtain 
other strategic advantages (Seth, 1990a; 1990b; Markides & Oyon, 1998; Capron, 
1999; UNCTAD, 2000). 
Even though there are these potential benefits, the bulk of empirical studies on 
the performance of the M&As have shown that most M&As fail to realize the 
expected gains. In the finance literature, researchers use an event study methodology 
to examine the stock price reaction to M&A activities. In the industrial organization 
literature, accounting data has been used as an alternative assessment to measure the 
performance of M&As. Most of the studies in both streams show that a large number 
of M&As are not successful as they do not produce better results, in terms of stock 
price and profitability, than those firms not engaging in M&As (Ravenscraft & 
Scherer, 1987; Rangan, et al., 1994; Bild, 1998; Markides & Oyon, 1998). 
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Almost all of the existing empirical work, such as that cited above, has been 
based on acquisition data from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other 
developed countries. There is scant evidence from the context of Asia.  
This thesis is motivated in part by the empirical need to investigate the 
performance of cross-border M&As in Asia. International merger and acquisition 
activities in Asia have several points of interest. First, statistics show an obvious 
boom of cross-border M&As in Asia. According to UNCTAD’s World Investment 
Report (2000: 52), “cross-border M&As in South, East, and South-East Asia reached 
an annual average $20 billion during 1997-1999, compared to an average of $7 billion 
during the pre-crisis years of 1994-1996.”  
On one hand, the efforts of the most countries in Asia to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) have built a more favorable business environment for investors. The 
deregulation policy and developments on legislation and accounting systems have 
facilitated firms to undertake mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, 
increasingly intense global competition has forced firms to keep looking for new 
business opportunities to survive and prosper. Asia is considered to be a huge 
promising market, with regard to both its cheap factors and to its growing 
consumption needs as accompanied by the economy recovery and growth of the 
region. M&As can provide firms with a rapid access to this potential market. Hence, 
it is important to study cross-border M&As in Asia to understand FDI and economic 
growth in this region. 
Second, it is interesting to study M&As within the context of Asia because of the 
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unique features of countries in this region. Given the special context of Asia in the 
sense of its relatively lagged development in the markets for corporate control, it is a 
reasonable question to examine whether the M&As in Asia perform as those 
undertaken in the developed country context. In explaining the unsatisfactory 
performance of M&As in developed countries, researchers point out that the high 
acquisition premium and the complex post-acquisition integration could be the major 
reasons for the poor performance. For firms to actually benefit from M&As, there 
must be net benefits in the M&A, meaning the value created through acquisitions 
should be larger than the premium paid plus the cost of post-acquisition integration.   
In developed countries, which have relatively mature and efficient financial and 
informative markets, it is quite usual that the competition among potential bidders 
would drive up the target price, ending up with, at best, zero net benefits for the final 
acquirer (Capron & Pistre, 2002). In Asia, in contrast, the market for corporate 
control in many countries is imperfectly competitive, which might facilitate acquiring 
firms to obtain abnormal returns through an M&A.  
The information on target firms in Asian countries is not as transparent and 
public as in the United States and the United Kingdom. The early stage of 
development of stock markets in developing Asian countries can reduce the extent of 
competition among potential bidders in an M&A. Furthermore, scholars pointed out 
that the assets of many Asian firms were significantly undervalued after the financial 
crisis, which resulted in a number of M&As being dealt at a rather low price, in a so 
called “fire sale” (for example, see Singh & Yip, 2000). As a result, there could be 
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favorable opportunities for cross-border M&As in Asia. In this thesis, I attempt to 
understand the performance of cross-border M&As in this Asian context. 
As stated above, this study is motivated by the increasing trend of cross-border 
M&As in Asia and the special features of the Asian context and Asian firms. 
Specifically, the major purposes of my thesis are to: 
1. Examine the performance of cross-border M&As in Asia; 
2. Investigate the determinants of acquirer performance 
 
1.2 Contributions 
This thesis contributes to research on mergers and acquisitions in two ways.  First, it 
expands the empirical context for cross-border M&As research by framing the work 
in the context of Asia.  Second, it enriches the conceptual and theoretical work on 
cross-border M&As by investigating a comprehensive list of determinants of acquirer 
performance. 
    Previously, few studies in the M&A field have focused on the special context of 
Asia; instead, most studies were based on M&As that took place in developed 
countries. There is a general need to include Asia as an empirical context, since the 
existing research findings from developed country studies may not be applicable. Asia 
represents a special and different case; the relatively inefficient markets for capital 
and information and the specific post-crisis period in Asia might possibly help 
acquiring firms to avoid overpaying in their acquisition premium, which in turn 
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enabled these firms to capture the net benefits of acquisitions. By comparing the 
findings of Asian context with those of developed economy setting, we can have a 
better understanding of whether institutional factors matter in the M&A performance 
issue. 
    This study also extends the existing literature on M&As by developing a 
conceptual model to investigate the determinants of acquirer performance. In the 
existing literature, researchers have identified several influential factors of M&A 
performance. However, there has not been an ideal way to frame these factors into 
one comprehensive picture, with perhaps missing determinants. Further, the empirical 
findings of these effects are far from conclusive. I try to enrich this research area by 
providing a conceptual model that not only identifies the elements influencing the 
potential value creation within M&As, but take into account the elements determining 
the total costs of M&A investments as well. 
 
1.3 Findings 
To make this investigation, I use a sample of 314 cross-border M&As undertaken in 
Asia between 1985 and 1999. These 314 transactions were conducted by firms from 
the U.S., Hong Kong, and Singapore in 11 Asian countries. I define the acquirer 
performance as the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to the acquiring firms over 
the event period. I retrieved information on the 314 acquisitions from the “World 
M&As Databases” on the SDC Platinum. I obtained supplementary information from 
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CRSP, PACAP, Worldscope, and etc. I gathered the CARs for U.S. acquiring firms 
through the EventUs software available on the website of Wharton Research Database 
Center. I calculated the CARs for Asian acquirers according to the standard 
procedures in event studies. 
The Patell Z tests in this study show that on average, acquirers earn insignificant 
abnormal returns from cross-border M&As in Asia. Further, the results for tests on 
subsamples show that only the U.S. acquirers enjoy significantly positive returns of 
1.12 percent; acquiring firms from Hong Kong and Singapore neither win nor lose 
significantly from M&As.  
The results for OLS regressions support part of the hypotheses, that is, 1) 
acquiring firms with superior ownership advantages would enjoy better performance, 
2) related M&As are expected to generate more benefits to acquirers than unrelated 
M&As, and 3) the tests also find a significant U-shape relationship between acquirer 
performance and acquisition experience. On the other hand, contradictory to my 
original expectation, the results show that 4) the positive effect of intangible assets on 
acquirer performance is weakened if the acquiring firm is undertaking a related 
M&As instead of an unrelated one. In addition, I do not find significant support to the 
hypotheses on the effect of acquirer’s knowledge about the target firm. 
 
1.4 Organization 
This thesis has six chapters. This first chapter described the motivations, contributions, 
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and findings of this thesis. Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on mergers 
and acquisitions. In the third chapter, I develop my hypotheses concerning the 
determinants of acquirer performance. Chapter 4 describes the data and methodology. 
I report the results of my statistical tests in chapter 5. I discuss the results in chapter 6. 
Also, in chapter 6, I outline the conclusions, limitations, implications and future 
directions associated with this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Academic research on mergers and acquisitions is just as intense and dynamic as the 
M&A activities undertaken in the business world. In this chapter, I will review the 
studies on M&As that have been done during the past half century. I will review three 
areas of research: 1) the literature on motivations for M&As; 2) the studies on the 
performance of M&As; 3) the limitations in the existing literature on M&As. 
    Researchers have proposed various hypotheses to explain the motivations for 
M&A activities. These mainly includes the operating efficiency hypothesis, the 
market power hypothesis, the diversification hypothesis, and other 
non-value-increasing hypotheses such as the managerial discretion hypothesis 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Marris, 1963), the cash flow hypothesis (Jensen & Ruback, 1983) 
and the hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986). 
    The performance of M&As has also received much attention in this research area. 
Two types of methodologies have been widely used: event studies and outcome 
studies (Tichy, 2001). Most event studies have found that the shareholders of the 
target firm enjoy abnormal return of 20-30% around the time of announcement while 
the acquirer’s shareholders more or less break even. An extended event window 
reveals a declining trend of abnormal returns to the acquiring firm’s shareholders 
(Agrawal, et al., 1992; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Conn et al., 2001). On the other hand, 
industrial organization economists have adopted outcome studies to compare the pre- 
and post-acquisition performance, or compare the M&A performance with that of 
matching firms. Most outcome studies find a profit deterioration effect of the M&A 
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investments (Mueller, 1980, 1985; 1986; Cosh et al., 1989; Ravenscarft & Scherer, 
1987, 1989)  
    The literature of M&A is influenced by two key issues: first, the findings about 
the influential factors of M&A performance are inconclusive. Although researchers 
have identified some elements such as relative size, relatedness, and payment mode, 
evidence on the impact of these factors on M&A performance is not conclusive and 
many other factors are absent on the list. Second, the researchers in this area have 
paid scant attention to the M&As undertaken in the context of Asia. Almost all the 
studies have chosen a developed economy (especially U.S. and U.K.) as their research 
setting. As an M&A boom has been emerging in Asia, there is an increasing need for 
researchers to take a closer look into the M&A stories that have happened in this 
region. 
 
2.1 Why do firms undertake M&As? 
A number of hypotheses have been proposed to explain the driving forces of M&As. 
M&A is considered as a tool for firms to response to the changing business 
environment. Capron (1995) does a historical analysis of three waves of M&As in the 
United States, and she identifies that M&As can be viewed as firms’ strategic 
responses to the changing business environment. Technological development, the 
introduction of mass production techniques and transportation development, and other 
institutional elements such as anti-trust legislation and stock market vitality all are the 
  - 10 - 
triggering factors that impel firms onto the arena of M&As.  
    In addition to the macro-level driving forces, strategic researchers pay more 
attention to the micro-level motivations of M&As. Generally, the literature 
categorizes such motivations into two broad groups: value-increasing and 
non-value-increasing (Seth, 1990a).  
 
2.1.1 Hypotheses about M&As driven by value-increasing motives 
Value-maximizing arguments predict an increase in the value of the acquiring and 
target firms. According to the definition by Seth (1990a), value creation is realized by 
making the best of a firm’s assets and resources under the environmental opportunities 
and constraints faced by the firm. In an M&A, the combination of various resources 
of both the acquirer and the target provides the basis for value creation. There are a 
number of hypotheses about the value-enhancing motivations for M&As. Here, I 
divide the motivations into four categories: 1) enhance market power; 2) improve 
operating efficiency; 3) financial benefits; and 4) diversification of risk. Each 
motivation is reviewed in turn. 
    Market power. The dominant-firm model of oligopoly implies that prices will 
rise as a consequence of an acquisition by a dominant firm (Seth, 1990a). By taking 
over existing competitors, firms as market participants, can reduce the competition in 
the market and strengthen their ability to control price, quantity, or the nature of 
products, generating abnormal profits as a result. In the high-tech markets, mergers 
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and acquisitions can provide the small market followers with a good opportunity to 
achieve a greater size so that they might be better able to share their operating and 
R&D costs and improve their competitive positions in the market. Empirical studies 
have provided evidence that market power serves as a source of value creation in 
mergers and acquisitions (Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983). 
    Operating efficiency. Hypotheses about operating efficiency refer to firms 
undertake M&As with the goal of achieving economies of scale or scope by pooling 
the production, R&D, marketing, HR, and management resources of the merging 
firms (Kitching, 1967; Seth, 1990a).  
Synergistic gains are widely cited as an important justification for M&As. 
Managers would consider M&A as an attractive tool to enhance purchasing power 
(more likely to obtain a quantity discount) and to justify more expensive but more 
efficient machinery (Kitching, 1967). In addition, through pooling of technological or 
marketing resources, M&As could help to eliminate or redeploy redundant capacities, 
thereby reducing the total cost and in turn enhancing the performance of the firms 
(Porter, 1980; Seth, 1990a).  
Financial benefits. Wiggins (1981) pointed out that scale economies can also be 
attainable when large firms raise money in capital markets. Given that an internal 
capital market could be built up through M&A, especially when the income streams 
of merging firms are imperfectly related, the viability of net cash flow and the risk of 
bankruptcy are reduced. Therefore, a firm’s ability to borrow is correspondingly 
improved, which might potentially enhance the firm performance. 
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Diversification of risk. Compared with the previous three points which have 
received common recognition, the risk diversification argument is more controversial. 
Some scholars considered it to be a motive for M&As, while others do not. The 
proponents argue that by following the logic of financial benefits, acquiring a 
different business can smooth the variance of a firm’s returns, thereby leading to a 
reduction of risk.  
But this argument also induces many objections. Some scholars have pointed out 
that under the assumption of perfect capital markets, individual investors can 
duplicate this risk pooling through personal portfolio diversification (Seth, 1990a). 
Under such circumstances where risk-averse investors optimally hold diversified 
portfolios, only systematic risk will matter in pricing a security. However, systematic 
risk cannot be reduced by diversification, and therefore no value would arise from this 
risk pooling by company diversification. Only in the presence of market imperfections 
such as high information costs (Lintner, 1971), can we expect this risk pooling to 
create value in mergers and acquisitions.  
I include this idea as a hypothesis as one of explanations for cross-border M&A 
motivations. This is mainly because of the presence of barriers in international capital 
markets. In global markets, it is more difficult for individual investors to access to 
foreign capital for his/her portfolio diversification than for a company to infuse its 
capital into foreign businesses for its diversification.  
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2.1.2 Hypotheses about non-value-increasing motivations 
In addition to the various hypotheses that expect M&As to be a value-enhancing tool 
for firms, researchers have also proposed another set of arguments stating that M&As 
might be driven by some other factors which are unrelated to value enhancement. 
Among such arguments, the hubris hypothesis and the managerial discretion 
hypothesis are the most widely cited explanations.  
The hubris hypothesis. Roll(1986) explained the “winner’s curse” by 
suggesting that managers of the acquiring firm might suffer from “hubris”. He pointed 
out that each manager is likely to be over-confident in his or her ability to better 
manage the acquired assets than the average acquirers. Especially during high market 
cycles, speculative fever is booming with the stock market, which would also amplify 
acquirers’ expectations about the value of target firms (Markham, 1955; Gort, 1970; 
Pangarkar & Junius, 2004). Because of the over-confidence of acquirer managers, 
they might not be able to really spot value in the target; instead, they tend to overpay 
and lead to a loss in the wealth of acquirer’s shareholders.  
The managerial discretion hypothesis. This hypothesis postulates that M&As 
may be driven by managerial efforts to pursue personal gains at the expense of 
stockholders’ interests. (Jensen 1986; Morck et al. 1990) For managers as the agent of 
a firm, their compensation is usually linked with the sales or assets of the firm. 
Baumol (1967) pointed out that individual managers might try to enhance their power, 
prestige, job-security and salaries by seeking corporate expansion or controlling a 
large empire. Especially when corporate governance is weak, managers can pursue 
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their own interests even if the expansion of the firm is beyond the optimal size that 
maximizes the welfare of stockholders (Jensen 1986).  
Mergers and acquisitions motivated by this managerial discretionary behavior 
have no synergistic gains to be allocated among the firms. Under the goal of “empire 
building”, managers tend to be willing to overpay for the target firms (Eun et al. 
1996). Acquisitions of this non-value-maximizing type could probably be an overall 
economic loss (Halpern, 1973).  
Mathur et al (1994) also pointed out three types of managers might probably 
demonstrate this managerial discretionary behavior: managers of firms with free or 
excess cash flows, manager of firms in declining industries, and managers of firms in 
slow-growth economies with limited investment opportunities. 
 
2.2 M&A Performance 
Broadly speaking, the empirical research on the performance of M&As has been 
conducted in two major approaches: event studies, and outcome studies. The first one 
is commonly applied in the finance literature, whereas the second one is more 
frequently used by industrial organization economists. In my thesis, I follow the 
standard methodology of event studies to examine acquirer performance. But before I 
review in more details the event studies on M&A performance, I briefly discuss about 
the outcome studies that have been conducted in the literature of M&A.  
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2.2.1 Outcome studies 
Industrial organization economists use outcome studies to examine the performance 
effect of M&As. Using the stock market response as a measure for M&A performance, 
outcome studies compare the pre- and post-acquisition performance, and compare the 
merging firms with matching firms or the base industry (Tichy, 2001). Table 2-1 lists 
several outcome studies on M&As. 
Scherer (1988) has argued that it is better to investigate the impact of M&As by 
looking directly at a firm’s profitability at the time an M&A occurs, and the changes 
in their profit performance over a substantial period of time following M&As. 
Through the analysis of accounting data, scholars should therefore be able to learn 
what actually happened after merger. But the empirical findings of outcome studies 
did not provide any compelling evidence about M&A performance. 
Mueller (1986) studies a sample of 551 U.S. manufacturing firms that undertook 
M&As during the period of 1950-1972, and he found that compared with the matched 
firms, the firms included in his sample suffered a significant loss in both market share 
and the rate of return on equity. Ravenscraft & Scherer (1987) find similar results by 
examining a sample of about 6,000 acquisitions completed during 1950-1977. They 
also investigate the effects of purchase mode and hostile takeovers on M&A 
performance, and they revealed a significant deterioration effect of M&A.  
In the UK setting, by comparing the pre- and post-merger profitability (measured 
by ROA) relative to the industry average, Meeks (1977) reveals in his sample of 233 
UK acquiring firms (1964-1972) that acquiring firms suffer a substantial decline in 
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their profitability after an acquisition. In some cases, the loss amounts to a subnormal 
return of -50 percent. Other studies (Hoshino, 1982; Lang et al., 1989; Cosh, et al. 
1989, etc.) also find negative performance effects of mergers and acquisitions. 
However, there are several limitations with the outcome studies approach. First, 
for the before-and-after analyses, problems may occur when the target firm is quite 
small relative to the acquirer, for example, with less than five percent of the acquiring 
firm’s assets on average. In such a case, whatever weighted average financial 
performance the target firm contributes to the M&A is likely to be “swamped” within 
the consolidated reports for the whole corporate entity (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987).  
Second, there is a different difficulty in analyses using similar firms as control 
groups. For example, the large U.S. corporations of the 1970s were active 
merger-makers and also highly diversified. Therefore, it is difficult to establish a 
control group of firms with similar size and industrial roots but not involved in M&As 
(Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). 
Third, another critical limitation of the outcome studies is concerned with the 
application of accounting data. As the information on the financial sheets usually 
reflects how well the whole business operations are performing over a certain period, 
such accounting data might include information about many events which occur 
during that period, not exclusively about the M&A transaction. However, the event 
studies can deal with this problem properly. 
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2.2.2 Event studies 
Event studies are used to analyze stock market reactions to the events that occur at the 
time of an M&A or in its aftermath. This approach generally assumes that the stock 
market is efficient and therefore changes in the share prices of the acquiring and target 
firms reflect the value of the economic impact of an acquisition, after controlling for 
the general market movements and systematic risk. In Table 2-2, I list some selected 
event studies on M&A performance. 
    The results from various event studies suggest that the impact of an acquisition 
on a target firm is positive. Within a several-week time “window” around the event 
(that is, the announcement of the M&A), the target’s stock price rises sharply so that 
the stockholders of the target firm earn substantial positive abnormal returns (Dodd & 
Ruback, 1977; Bradley, 1980; Bradley et al., 1983; Asquith, 1983; Eckbo, 1983). 
 On the other hand, the results for acquiring firms are less consistent. About 
one-third of the studies on published shareholder value indicated a positive effect for 
the acquiring firm (Schenk, 2000). For example, Asquith et al. (1983) examined 214 
merger bids initiated by Fortune 1000 firms during the period from 1963 to 1979. A 
time period from 20 days before until the announcement day was used as the event 
window. Their study shows that the average cumulative abnormal return is 2.8% at a 
statistically significant level. Furthermore, by controlling for the relative size of 
merging firms, for the time period in which the merger is undertaken, and for the 
eventual outcome of the bid, the authors find even larger abnormal returns. Bradley et 
al. (1988) also find that acquiring firms in the United States earned positive returns 
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during the unregulated period of 1963-1968.  
But other studies have shown that a bidding firm’s shareholders generally 
break-even or lose. Dodd (1980), and Asquith (1983) find that acquiring firms earn 
either zero or small negative but significant returns; Loderer and Martin (1990), in a 
study of takeovers, show that bidders obtained negative but insignificant returns in the 
period of 1981-1984, which is consistent with the findings by Bradley et al. (1988) for 
the same time period.  
The evidence above is consistent with the findings of Jensen & Ruback (1983) 
and Jarrell et al. (1988). Overall, M&As create value for shareholders of the target and 
acquirer as a whole; however, most of the gains accrue to the target firm’s 
shareholders. Shareholders of acquiring firms are assuming the risk of actually 
suffering a loss from the transactions. 
   In contrast to the traditional wisdom of using the announcement-period as the 
event window, several recent papers extend the length of time horizon examined 
(Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998; Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; 
etc.).The long-horizon event studies tend to reveal a negative drift in the stock prices 
of acquiring firms. For example, Loughran & Vijh (1997) find the abnormal returns 
over the 5-year period after the M&A announcement are -24.2 percent for acquirers 
financing by stock. Megginson et al. (2000) use a sample of 204 acquisitions 
undertaken during the period of 1977-1996 and find acquirers suffer a loss in 
abnormal returns of -13 percent within a 3-year period an M&A has been 
implemented.  
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Event study analysis also has its own limitations. Its assumption of stock market 
efficiency has induced a variety of objections. Basically, an event study investigates 
the market expectation of an M&A’s consequences. However, the stock market’s 
reaction may not be necessarily correct in its prediction. The best available 
information may not be easily accessible. Therefore, it is questionable whether stock 
prices reflect the true value of firms. In this sense, event studies are not the best 
approach to be applied in a research setting with underdeveloped capital markets. But 
in this thesis, as the United States, Singapore and Hong Kong are developed 
economies, it is to some extent justifiable to use event studies to examine M&A 
performance. 
 
2.3 The limitations in the existing literature of M&A 
The literature of M&A has not developed a comprehensive framework to identify the 
determinants of M&A performance. In addition, studies focusing on the developed 
economy setting account for a dominant proportion in the existing literature, with 
little attention given to M&As that occur in the developing countries. In this section, I 
first discuss some of the existing studies on the determinants of M&A performance, 
and then I provide a review of the M&A trend in Asia and the few studies that have 
been conducted on this context. 
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2.3.1 The literature on determinants of M&A performance 
This research area is influenced by two issues: 1) findings about the performance 
effect of the identified factors are not consistent; 2) there are numerous other 
influences that could be considered.  
Relatedness. This is one of the controversial factors that might impact the 
performance of an M&A. The research question, “whether different acquisition 
strategies (in terms of relatedness) are associated with different degrees of economic 
gains”, has received intense discussion among strategy researchers. However, the 
empirical findings are not so clear cut. Singh & Montgomery (1987) study a sample 
of 105 large mergers that were conducted between 1975 and 1979. Their results show 
that related mergers enjoy better abnormal returns than unrelated mergers. Yet 
Chatterjee (1986), Elgers & Clark (1980) find that conglomerate mergers produce 
better wealth effects for shareholders of both the acquirer and target than 
non-conglomerate mergers do. On the other hand, other work reveals no significant 
performance differentiation across the different types of mergers and acquisitions 
(Wansley et al., 1983; Lubatkin, 1987; Seth, 1990b; etc.) 
Relative size. Asquith et al. (1983) point out that the stock market reaction for 
acquiring firms will vary with the relative size of acquirer to target firm. They divided 
the sample into two groups, bids in which the target firm’s equity value is greater than 
10% of the acquirer’s value and bids where the target’s value is less than 10%. They 
find cumulative abnormal returns are significantly greater when the target’s value is 
larger than 10%. Over the event period of (-20,0), the cumulative abnormal return to 
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the bidders is 4.1%, when the target’s value is larger than 10% of the bidder’s value; 
in contrast, in the comparing group (less than 10%), bidders only obtain a cumulative 
abnormal return of 1.7%.  
However, other researchers argue that smaller targets (less than 10% of the 
acquiring firm) are much easier to integrate and consequently reduce the failure rate 
(Copeland, et al., 1994). Further, another problem is identified in testing this factor: 
the relevant information about the target size is not easily accessible (Morck & Yeung, 
1992).  
Payment mode. Payment by cash or stock is another commonly tested factor in 
studies of M&A performance. Basically, the idea is that when the managers of the 
acquiring firm perceive the equity is overvalued by the stock market, they are more 
likely to choose stock-financing for their M&A investment (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
However, such information will be conveyed along with the equity issue, and the 
outsider investors will bid down the stock price of the acquiring firm. 
The question is, should this be considered as a factor related to M&A 
performance. Andrade et al. (2001) points out that stock-financed M&As could be 
considered as two simultaneous transactions: an M&A transaction and an equity issue. 
It is the second issue that is impacted by the stock-financing. Should we link the 
payment mode to the performance of M&A transaction per se? 
Market cycle. Researchers argue that low market cycles can provide better 
acquisition opportunities for two major reasons (Pangarkar & Junius, 2004). First, 
during low market cycles, managers are less likely to be affected by hubris and more 
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likely to avoid overpaying for the target. Second, during low market cycles, there is 
more likely to be a recognition of the need for reform among a firm’s shareholders, 
employees, and creditors (Barton, et al., 2002), therefore it is much easier to 
implement post-acquisition restructuring (Pangarkar & Junius, 2004). 
However, this market cycle argument has not been tested widely, with the 
exception of Kusewitt (1985), Lubatkin & Chatterjee (1991), and Pangarkar & Junius 
(2004). These studies report significant support of the market cycle argument.  
 
2.3.2 M&As in Asia 
There has been a rapid increase in M&A activities in Asia in recent years. Studies 
indicate that there has been a boom of cross-border M&As in Asian countries in the 
past 10 years (UNCTAD’s World Investment Report, 2000). Basically, two types of 
cross-border M&As occur in this region: firms of developed countries (especially U.S. 
and West Europe) acquiring Asian targets, and intra-regional cross-border M&As 
(usually firms from Singapore and Hong Kong acquire firms of other countries in this 
region).  
    Although the M&A transactions in Asia are becoming more frequent, little 
research attention has been paid on this area. Even within the few exceptions, the 
findings about the acquirer performance are not conclusive. (Table 2-3) Koh and Lee 
(1988) find zero returns to acquiring firms based on their study on a sample of 85 
M&A transactions that were conducted during the period of 1973-1984. Pangarkar 
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and Junius (2004) use a larger sample (115 acquisitions) and find robust support for 
significantly positive returns. In contrast, Lee et al. (1997) investigate 39 acquisitions 
completed between 1983 and 1992, and they conclude acquiring firms experience 




As reviewed in this chapter, the literature on M&As is a dynamic research area,  In 
prior research, a number of hypotheses have been proposed to explain why firms 
undertake M&As, and debates exist on the determinants of performance of M&As. 
On the other hand, however, the findings about the determinants of M&A 
performance are far from conclusive, and the Asian context has not received much 
research attention. My thesis addresses these two issues by investigating the 
influential factors of acquirer performance (Chapters 3) as tested by a sample of 
cross-border M&As undertaken in Asian countries (Chapters 4 and 5).
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CHAPTER 3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
There have been a large number of studies on mergers and acquisitions undertaken in 
developed countries, but there is little research focusing on the context of M&As in 
developing countries, especially on the M&A stories of Asia.  
Facing increasingly intense global competition, multinational corporations 
(MNCs) have tended to shift their production bases to countries with relatively low 
labor costs. Asia is just one of the target regions. Further, accompanying two decades 
of high economic growth, the emerging rise of significant consumer demand in Asian 
countries has also attracted significant investments from MNCs, especially those from 
North America and Europe. At the same time, most governments of countries in Asia 
have been making an effort to build up a more favorable business environment for 
foreign investors. Statistics clearly identify a corresponding boom of cross-border 
M&As in Asia: cross-border M&As in South, East, and South-East Asia reached an 
annual average of USD $20 billion during 1997-1999, while during the pre-crisis 
years of 1994-1996, it was just an average of $7 billion (UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Report, 2000). 
However, compared with developed countries, Asia may yield a much different 
story for the acquisitions of MNCs. In the U.S. and Europe, focus on core businesses 
seems to be the main stream approach of corporate strategies; but in Asia，many of the 
institutions supporting Western companies’ business activities are absent. Will the 
focused strategies still be beneficial to the M&As transactions in Asia? Further, given 
the existence of a large number of private firms, merger and acquisition in Asia 
activities tend to be mainly undertaken not through the stock market, but through 
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private negotiations. What will we find about the performance of M&As undertaken 
in the Asian countries, given this difference? What will be factors that influence the 
performance of an acquisition consummated in the developing countries, rather than 
in a typical developed country setting? Will the results about the performance of 
acquisitions, for example, be different as compared with those based on the U.S. or 
UK experience? If there is any difference, what could be the reason behind the 
difference? This chapter identifies the hypotheses that address these questions.  
The conceptual model underlying this thesis, which I will explain in more detail 
in this chapter, is illustrated in Figure 3-1. 
 
To address the research question, “What are the factors influencing the performance 
of M&As in Asian countries?”, I adopt the following underlying logic.  The 
performance of M&As on the stock market depends upon the market’s valuation of 
the net present value (NPV) of the M&A transactions. Because the NPV of an M&A 
is decided by two parts, value created by the transaction and the cost of this 
investment, I try to transform the research question into identifying the factors that 
influence the realization of value creation and the factors that determine the 
investment cost of an M&A transaction. Following the logic described above, I 
investigate my suspicion that the stock market performance of the acquiring firm in an 
M&A would be influenced by 1) the acquirer’s ownership advantages; 2) the business 
relatedness between the acquiring firm and the target firm; 3) acquirer’s knowledge 
about the target firm; and 4) the acquirer’s experience of M&A activities. The former 
two determine the acquiring firm’s ability to create value in the M&A, whereas the 
latter two influence the cost of an M&A transaction.  
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3.1 Factors influencing value creation 
In the context of an M&A, value creation is a process which involves combining and 
making optimal use of the two merging firms’ specialized resources (technology, 
production, marketing, finance, human resource, etc.) (Seth, 1990a). Therefore, we 
can expect that the achievement of value creation is highly related to two factors: 
1) The resources that are productive and transferable within the M&A; 
2) The conditions for the combination and reconfiguration of the resources.  
In the following sections, I will discuss the impact of acquirer’s ownership advantages 
on the M&A performance first, and then the relationship between business relatedness 
and firm performance.  This is followed by my analysis of the interaction between 
the ownership advantages and business relatedness. 
 
3.1.1 Ownership advantages of the acquiring firm 
Internalization theory (Caves 1971, Buckley & Casson 1976; Hymer 1976) indicates 
that foreign direct investment could create value for an MNC when a firm is able to 
exploit internally its firm-specific intangible assets. Such assets commonly include 
technological know-how, marketing ability, and effective management (Morck & 
Yeung, 1992).  
Caves (1986) posits that intangible assets have certain characteristics of public 
goods. The value of these assets should increase in proportion to the scale of a firm’s 
markets (Morck & Yeung, 1992), which means that such superior intangible assets 
could potentially add value to the firm when foreign direct investment occurs.  
However, a firm must internalize the market for these assets in order to realize 
their latent, potential additional value. According to internalization theory, the market 
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for the resources outlined above is characterized by a variety of imperfections such as 
information asymmetry, immobility, and risk of misappropriation. Firms may have 
different perceptions of the value of a strategic resource; and many strategic resources 
are intangible, which makes it more difficult to value the resources in question. 
Further, the immobility of resources implies that firms’ resources cannot be readily 
traded on the market. Even if such resources could be traded on the market, market 
exchange can be accompanied by high risks of misappropriations. Given the 
substantial transaction costs on the market for firm resources, firms must internalize 
the market to reap the competitive advantages of making such an acquisition of 
resources. 
Based on the arguments above, we can observe that intangible assets could add 
value to MNCs’ foreign direct investment, and such additional value could be realized 
only when an MNC internalizes the market for its intangible assets. Using this logic, I 
argue that when firms possessing superior intangible assets expand their businesses 
abroad through cross-border M&As, they are able to reap the rewards arising from 
internally applying their intangible assets over an increased scale. This should be then 
reflected in a firm’s market value.  
Morck & Yeung (1992) studied a sample of 322 foreign acquisitions by U.S. 
firms between 1978 and 1988 and they find that firms possessing information-based 
assets experience a significantly positive stock market response to the announcement 
of a cross-border acquisition. Markides & Oyon’s study (1998) also provides strong 
support that cross-border acquisitions enable firms to optimize their firm-specific 
intangible assets and thereby increase the market value of these firms. 
Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between the intangible assets of the 
acquiring firm and the cumulative abnormal returns to the acquiring firm.  
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Hypothesis 1: Acquirer performance is positively 
related to the quantity of intangible assets possessed 
prior to the acquisition.  
 
3.1.2 Business relatedness between acquiring and target firms 
In this section, I take a close look into how to realize the potential benefits of an 
acquisition by identifying the types of these benefits in an M&A, and then developing 
my second hypothesis about the performance impact of relatedness between merging 
firms.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the potential benefits in an M&A could be categorized 
into market power, operating efficiency, financial benefits, and risk diversification. 
Different degree of relatedness between merging firms provides the basis for realizing 
the various benefits in M&As. By related M&As, I refer to those in which acquiring 
firms and target firms conduct similar science-based research activities, employ 
similar production technologies, serve similar markets or use similar distribution 
systems (Rumelt, 1974). An M&A may be considered unrelated when the key success 
variables of two firms’ businesses are unrelated. Market power and operating 
efficiency are associated with related M&As, whereas financial benefits and risk 
diversification are usually achieved in unrelated M&As.  
When the acquiring firm targets a business characterized with similar R&D, 
production, marketing and distribution activities, it is more likely to improve its 
competitive position and strengthen its market power (Kitching, 1967; Seth, 1990a; 
Porter, 1980). For example, in some industries, firms have to achieve a critical mass 
of resources in order to effectively outperform the competition. Related M&As help 
  - 29 - 
many small companies to attain a large size giving them sufficient cash flow to 
undertake R&D research to compete against entrenched companies. Related M&As 
also offer good opportunities for collusion (Stigler, 1968). Empirical evidence has 
shown that a dominant firm can benefit from a horizontal acquisition by strengthening 
its ability to control the price and quantity of the products it sold (Eckbo, 1983).  
When the acquiring firms undertake related M&As, they can also potentially 
enhance operating efficiency. Researchers have proposed a number of arguments to 
explain how such benefits are generated in related M&As (Seth, 1990b; Baumol et al., 
1982; Choi & Philippatos, 1983). Cost reductions can be realized through economies 
of scale in purchase, production, and inventory. Pooling of R&D, advertising, 
marketing, or management resources of two firms could also help to reduce relevant 
costs. Economies of scope are another source for the operating efficiency that could 
be generated through M&As (Seth 1990b).  
    As discussed above, the possibility in realization of market power and operating 
efficiency would be higher in related M&As, rather than in unrelated ones. In another 
word, if none of the components along the value chain is shared between two merging 
firms, we can hardly expect such benefits (market power, and operating efficiency) to 
be generated. However, in unrelated M&As, another two types of benefits might be 
potentially realized: financial gains and diversification of risk. Realization of financial 
gains and risk diversification require that the income streams of the business units 
should be imperfectly correlated; unrelated M&As just provide such a base for 
releasing these potential benefits.  
    Unrelated diversification through cross-border M&As can potentially generate 
financial gains in two ways. Firstly, diversified M&As can build up an internal capital 
market, to efficiently allocate cash across different units, and increase the liquidity of 
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the firm. For example, through unrelated M&As in which the earning streams of 
merging firms are imperfectly related, cash can be routed from units operating with a 
surplus to units operating with a deficit to make up for the latter one’s concurrent 
deficiency (Kitching, 1967). Following this argument, as the variability of cash flow 
and the threat of bankruptcy are both reduced through an unrelated M&A, the 
company’s ability to borrow would correspondingly be improved. As a result, the 
company’s total cost of capital should thereby be lowered, which could provide 
stockholders with excess returns. 
    Diversification of risk is another argument to explain the potential benefits that 
could be generated in unrelated M&As. Although some researchers have argued that 
risk diversification through an M&A does not make much sense under the assumption 
of efficient capital market, it is still a potential source of value creation.  
The opponents to the risk diversification hypothesis point out that in an efficient 
capital market, unsystematic risk can also be reduced by the investor’s portfolio 
diversification as well as by company diversification, while systematic risk cannot be 
reduced either by portfolio diversification or by company diversification. Therefore, 
they posit that company diversification cannot provide stockholders with returns in 
excess of those available from a portfolio diversification. (Smith & Shreiner, 1969; 
Weston & Mansinghka, 1971; Mason & Gondzwaard, 1976) 
Diversification of risk can provide acquiring firms’ stockholders with excess 
returns when a cross-border M&A is undertaken in Asian countries. This is mainly 
because of the presence of barriers in international capital markets. Further, it is also 
difficult to acquire relevant information of the foreign businesses. Such barriers might 
prevent individual investors achieving an internationally-diversified portfolio. In 
contrast, companies can reduce unsystematic risk by diversifying into international 
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markets. Therefore, unrelated cross-border M&As could potentially generate financial 
synergies and risk diversification, which in turn improve the performance of an M&A.  
In summary, I argue that related M&As can potentially enhance performance by 
generating market power and operating efficiency, while unrelated M&As can 
probably add value by realizing financial gains and risk diversification. From this 
perspective, I predict that both related and unrelated M&As could generate positive 
gains to the acquiring firms. 
Hypothesis 2: Both related and unrelated M&As 
generate positive gains to the acquiring firms. 
 
3.1.3 Interaction between the relatedness and ownership advantages 
If we combine the arguments in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, we can illustrate the 
relationship between the different types of ownership advantages and the different 
types of M&As as in Table 3.1. 
 
Hypothesis 1 has expected a positive relationship between acquirer performance and 
the ownership advantages that the acquirer possesses. In this section, I predict that 
such a positive relationship can be strengthened if the acquiring firm is undertaking a 
related M&A. There should be a basis for the leverage of ownership advantages: how 
much technological and marketing knowledge or resources could be applied in the 
acquisition would be largely constrained by the scope of the businesses in question. 
When the business lines of the acquirer and the target are related, that means the 
acquiring firm is expanding into a market characterized with similar production, 
technology, and marketing activities as in its original markets. Under such 
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circumstances, the ownership advantages such as technological and marketing 
know-how can be better transferred and applied in the target markets. Therefore, I 
predict a positive impact of the interaction between relatedness and ownership 
advantages on the acquiring firm’s performance. 
Hypothesis 3: Acquirer performance is positively 
related to the interaction of the quantity and 
relatedness of intangible assets possessed prior to the 
acquisition. 
 
3.2 Factors influencing the cost of M&A 
The net present value of an M&A is decided not only by the benefits that could be 
potentially realized through M&A, but it is also decided by the cost of undertaking 
such an investment as well. If we consider an M&A investment as a process involving 
searching and valuing targets, negotiation, execution and integration, we can then 
break the cost of such investment into three parts: searching and valuing cost, 
negotiation cost and premium paid, and integration cost. In the following three 
sections, I will analyze the factors that determine the three types of cost one by one. 
 
3.2.1 Acquirer’s knowledge about target firm prior to the acquisition 
Searching and valuing targets is a preliminary but very important step of an M&A 
investment. The acquiring firm may overpay for the target if it is uncertain about the 
target’s true stand-alone value. On the other hand, if the acquiring firm gets a better 
picture of the target’s business, it may be better able to estimate the potential 
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synergies or benefits that could be generated through an M&A.  
    When MNCs undertake cross-border M&As in Asian countries, they may 
probably encounter more difficulties to access enough information about the target 
firms, than in the case of a domestic acquisition. First, as they expand abroad, they 
inevitably face the “liabilities of foreignness” (Hymer, 1976). It probably takes more 
time for the MNCs to better understand the local business environment, than a local 
business firm. It also requires that the managers of the acquiring firm dedicate more 
time and effort to looking for a suitable target. Further, most Asian countries are 
characterized with serious information asymmetry, which indicates that outsiders can 
hardly obtain a free flow of largely accurate information about companies. Given that, 
capital markets in developing Asian countries are lack of well-functioning institution 
mechanisms such as “reliable financial reporting system, a dynamic community of 
analysts, and an aggressive, independent financial press” (Khanna & Palepu, 1997: 
43).   
    Therefore, acquirer’s knowledge about the target firm is of particular 
significance when an MNC undertakes a cross-border M&A in Asia. One strategy to 
overcome this information disadvantage is to become involved in the company 
through a small equity stake (Kang, 1993).  If the acquirer holds the target shares 
before the acquisition, it could save a much time, effort and money for the acquiring 
firm to collect the relevant data of the target. Acquirer’s knowledge about the target 
firm that accompanies this small ownership could facilitate the acquirer to assess 
more accurately the true value of the target and the potential benefits of the merger, 
and then to make the right decision. 
    In summary, I expect acquirer’s knowledge about the target firm prior to the 
acquisition could reduce the searching cost and facilitate the target’s valuation, which 
  - 34 - 
in turn enhances the net present value of the M&A investment. 
Hypothesis 4: Acquirer performance is positively 
related to the level of the acquirer’s knowledge about 
the target firm prior to the acquisition. 
 
3.2.2 Prior organizational acquisition experience  
Execution of an M&A investment is a complicated process which absorbs significant 
amounts of managerial energy and time (Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland, 1990). Acquiring 
firms need to conduct extensive data collection and analysis to find viable acquisition 
candidates. When the target is set, the time-consuming negotiations begin. As the 
negotiations would directly determine how much premium the acquirer will pay and 
whether the acquirer is able to get a good deal, this process demands much attention 
and energy from the executives of the acquiring firm. Further, once the deal is made, 
the post-acquisition integration brings along another great challenge to the executives 
of the acquiring firm.   
According to the learning curve literature, firms could become more proficient at 
managing particular kinds of complicated organizational activities such as an 
acquisition, as they have more and more experience in undertaking such activities 
(Cyert & March, 1963). Haleblian & Finkelstein (1999) argue that good firm 
performance is more likely to persist and strengthen, while poor performance leads to 
behavioral diminution, just consistent with the behavioral principal – “rewarded” 
behavior to persist and “punished” behavior to diminish. From this perspective, firms 
that have undertaken M&As in the past will be more sophisticated in managing 
M&As and in extracting the benefits while simultaneously avoiding the pitfalls of 
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M&As.  
Therefore, I predict that with the accumulation of organizational acquisition 
experience, acquiring firms are able to manage the M&A investments more 
proficiently, which thereby could enhance their performance. 
Hypothesis 5: Acquirer performance is positively 




In summary, the net present value of an M&A transaction will be affected by the 
expected value creation and the estimated cost of this acquisition investment. 
Firm-specific ownership advantages can provide the acquirer with a superior 
competitive position in foreign markets, which in turn positively influence its stock 
market performance. Both related and unrelated M&As have the potential to generate 
gains to the acquiring firms. Furthermore, I suspect an acquirer possessing superior 
ownership advantages will exhibit better performance when it undertakes related 
M&As. 
When looking into the investment cost side, I expect the performance of the 
acquiring firms would be positively related to the extent of acquirer’s knowledge 
about the target firm, and its prior M&A experience.
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this chapter, I discuss the research design used to test the hypotheses proposed in 
the previous chapter. I examine the hypotheses by analyzing a sample of 314 M&A 
transactions undertaken in 11 Asian countries during the period of 1985-1999.  I 
provide my description of the regression model and the variable measures in the 
following paragraphs. I begin with a description of the setting, and the data. 
 
4.1 Setting 
I choose cross-border M&As undertaken during 1985-1999 in Asia as my research 
focus. Compared with the dominant research studies on M&As in the developed 
economies (especially the U.S.), the Asian context has received scant attention. 
However, as the global business environment changes, firms outside Asia make 
strategic responses to defend and improve their competitive position by paying much 
more attention to Asia than ever before. Further, the intra-Asia business activities have 
also become more and more dynamic, with the remarkable economic development of 
many countries in this region. Therefore, studies on M&As undertaken in Asia can not 
only help inform the literature on acquisitions about a growing phenomenon, but 
provide some helpful implications to the practitioners as well. 
 
4.2 Sample 
I obtained the M&A transactions in my thesis from the Thomson Financial Database 
of “Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions”. The “Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions” 
database covers international M&A transactions from 1985 to the present. It provides 
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information about the company profile of the acquirer and target, deal value, deal 
status, stock premiums, acquisition techniques and percent acquired, and so forth. 
    Originally, the dataset comprised 729 cross-border M&A transactions of 464 
acquiring firms. In my initial inspection, I identified 91 domestic transactions which I 
excluded from the original sample to make my study strictly focus on cross-border 
M&As. Further, as the information about Asian acquiring firms (from Hong Kong, 
and Singapore) after 1999 was not accessible, I excluded 150 transactions undertaken 
by U.S. firms after 1999 so that I can make reasonable cross-country comparisons 
using the same time periods. Finally, as my arguments and hypotheses developed in 
the previous chapters imply a focus on the major M&As in which the acquiring firms 
obtain the control right of the target firms after the transactions, I excluded 174 minor 
acquisition transactions where the acquiring firms obtained less than 50% shares of 
the target equity. These steps resulted in a sample of 314 cross-border M&A 
transactions completed during 1985-1999.  
    These 314 international transactions were made by 246 acquiring firms from the 
U.S., Hong Kong and Singapore. The U.S. firms seem to be the most active acquirer 
in my sample; more than half (60.83%) of the transactions were conducted by firms 
from the United States. Regarding the Asian acquirers, Hong Kong and Singapore 
firms completed 62 and 61 deals respectively during the period of 1985 - 1999.  
Looking into the years when these international M&As happened, I find two 
interesting observations. Firstly, there is an obvious increase in the M&A activities in 
this region after 1996. 57.01% of the total investment was conducted among the three 
years from 1997 to 1999. This is probably due to the economic crisis that occurred in 
1997. During the crisis, asset values collapsed and many assets that were previously 
inaccessible or difficult to acquire, became available and affordable (Singh & Yip, 
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2000). No matter whether firms are purely interested in bargain hunting, or they are 
seeking for investment opportunities for long-term performance, the Asian crisis 
brought them potentially attractive purchases.  
Taking a closer look, we can find another interesting phenomenon: most of the 
transactions after 1997 were contributed by U.S. firms. About two-thirds of the total 
125 transactions that occurred between 1998 and 1999 were conducted by U.S. firms. 
This is understandable since other Asian acquirers might be more or less be negatively 
impacted by the crisis in terms of the currency depreciation and the deterioration of 
the business environment in their countries. 
On the target side, the 314 transactions cover 11 Asian countries, of which China, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore had aggregately received 69.11% of the total 
investment. Interestingly, the number of international M&A transactions conducted in 
South Korea in the year of 1998 amounts to the aggregate of all the transactions that 
had been completed in this country in the previous 10 years. A major explanation to 
this evidence is that the Korean government adopted the policies to open its capital 
market after the crisis.  The government even abolished restrictions on foreign 
ownership of land (Chung & Wang, 2001).  
These cross-border M&A transactions involve target firms operating in 50 2-digit 
SIC industries. The most common sectors were electronic equipment (9.55%), 
business services (8.28%), chemical products (8.28%), durable wholesale trade, 
(7.96%), and food product (5.73%). A similar distribution applies to the acquiring 
firms from 46 different 2-digit SIC sectors.  
Furthermore, I also looked into the cross-distribution by the industries and target 
nations over the entire sample and each subsample (Hong Kong, Singapore, and U.S.) 
as well. (Table 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5) Continuing with the previous analysis, we can 
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further find that in the most common sector - electronic equipment, 40% of the 
investment in this sector took place in Hong Kong, and 20% in South Korea. Similarly, 
the deals completed in printing, chemical product, wholesale trade of durable goods, 
real estate, and business service industries are not equally distributed across the 11 
target nations either. All of the 8 transactions in printing, publishing and allied 
industries were undertaken in Hong Kong. In chemical product sectors, China and 
South Korea aggregately received nearly half (46.2%) of the investment. Among the 
total 11 Asian countries, Hong Kong and Malaysia are the most popular targets for 
foreign direct investment in the wholesale trade of durable goods. Seven of the 13 
transactions in real estate sector were conducted in China; for the business service 
sector, Hong Kong, Singapore, and China were the top three most popular target 
markets. 
In addition to the entire sample, I also investigate into each subsample based on 
the three country origins of acquiring firms. First, 77.4% of the Hong Kong acquiring 
firms took over a target firm in China, largely in China’s manufacturing, finance and 
service industries. Second, Malaysia is the most popular FDI destination countries for 
Singapore acquirers; 39.34% of the acquisitions by Singapore firms occurred in 
Malaysia. Singapore acquiring firms are more interested investing in the finance and 
service industries of the Malaysia and China markets. Third, compared with their 
Asian counterpart, U.S. acquirers focus much more on M&As in the manufacturing 
industries: about 54.97% of the total investment by U.S. acquiring firms went into the 
manufacturing sector. In contrast, only 34.15% of the acquirers from the two Asian 
countries were involved in an M&A in the manufacturing industries, but 39.02% in 
finance and business service. These figures are much higher than the corresponding 
level of 18.32% in the U.S. group. 
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Regarding the relatedness between the acquiring firms and target firms, in about 
64.33 percent of the transactions included in my sample, acquiring and target firms 
are operating in related industry sectors based on the business descriptions of the 
4-digit SIC codes, whereas 35.67 percent of the transactions in my sample are 
cross-border M&As in which acquiring firms come from unrelated sectors with the 
target firms at 4-digit SIC level.  
Doing a cross-country comparison, I find in my sample, that the Asia subsample 
(firms from Hong Kong and Singapore) seems to be a mix of related and unrelated 
M&As, while the U.S. acquiring firms are much more likely to undertake related 
M&As, with a frequency of nearly three times that of unrelated ones. From the 
perspective of target nations, on the other hand, 43 out of the 112 unrelated M&A 
deals flowed into China. Since one of the major motivations for an unrelated M&A is 
to smooth the variance in cash flow and to eventually diversify the risks, it is 
reasonable to find that a considerable proportion of the acquiring firms in my study 
choose to invest in China, a country with remarkable economic growth during the past 
decade. 
 
4.3 Model and measures 
As discussed in Chapter 2.2, two major approaches have been applied in the 
contemporary research on M&As: outcome studies and event studies. Industrial 
organization economists use outcome studies to compare the pre- and post-acquisition 
performance and to compare the merging firms with matching firms or the base 
industry. This approach would be particularly valuable if the acquisition is the only 
major strategic event in the firm in a year. However, if there are many other 
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contributors to the acquirer performance in the same period, it would be difficult to 
conclude whether any change in acquirer performance is singularly due to the M&A 
strategy or not. Since the information disclosed on the financial statements reflects 
how well the whole business operations perform over a certain fiscal period, such 
accounting data would include information about many events which occur during the 
same period. Therefore, the accounting data does not reflect the exclusive outcome of 
an M&A activity.  
In addition, problems may also occur when using the outcome studies to compare 
acquirer performance with a control group of similar firms. As I am studying on the 
cross-border M&As undertaken by acquiring firms from 3 different countries and 
across various industry sectors, it is difficult to establish a control group of firms with 
similar size and industrial roots but not involved in M&As.  
It is because of the limitations of the accounting approach discussed above, that I 
use the other accepted methodology, event studies, to examine the influence of an 
acquisition on the acquirer performance. Event studies examine the performance 
effect by evaluating the impact of a particular type of event on the stock prices of the 
affected firms.  
My selection of this methodology is based on an implicit assumption that the 
capital markets of U.S., Hong Kong and Singapore are efficient. The country origins 
of acquiring firms in my study comprise the United States, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
According to one study by World Bank, the overall development of the stock markets 
of these three countries was ranked at 2nd (Hong Kong), 4th (the United States) and 7th 
(Singapore) respectively (World Bank, 1995). In these economies, the capital market 
is characterized by strong regulation, reliable financial reporting, best practices, high 
liquidity, and excellent access to foreign institutional buyers (Pangarkar & Junius, 
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2004; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). For example, the World Bank Study indicates Hong 
Kong and U.S. stock markets are characterized with high liquidity as the total value of 
shares traded on the stock exchanges are greater than 40% of GDP; the United States 
has low mis-pricing values; the market of Singapore measured by indexes is more 
“developed” than France, Netherlands and Sweden. Therefore, I believe such 
characteristics can reasonably justify the adoption of an event study approach to 
examine the performance of acquiring firms from these three regions.  
I conducted statistical analysis to investigate the determinants of acquirer 
performance. The regression model which I constructed to test my hypotheses is 















The descriptive statistics of the measures used in this thesis is provided in Table 4-8 
attached at the end of this chapter. 
 
4.3.1 Cumulative abnormal returns 
Except for the U.S. subsample in which cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are 
obtained directly from the EventUs on the website of Wharton Research Database 
Center, I manually calculate the CARs for all the acquiring firms from Hong Kong and 
Singapore. I adopt the market model to present the return-generating process,  
mtiiit RR βα += , 
where Ri,t = daily return for firm i over day t; 
     Rmt = the return on the market portfolio over day t 
Then I use the OLS procedure to estimate the model parameters based on the period 
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from 300 days before till 30 days after the event announcement. After obtaining 
the βα ˆ,ˆ and , I calculate the daily abnormal return over the period t-20 to t+1 days for 
each security. I also applied other different event windows.  
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−= , (t=-20 to t=+1) 
Finally, I obtained cumulative abnormal returns for each security by aggregating the 









Both short and long-term event windows have been applied in the existing research of 
M&A performance. Andrade et al. (2001, page 113) have outlined several major 
concerns with the long-horizon window approach. For example, they pointed out that 
one of the basic concerns “stems from all tests of long-term abnormal performance 
being joint tests of stock market efficiency and a model of market equilibrium”. 
Compared with the zero expected returns in a short window, the expected returns for a 
three-year window could easily vary with the model used. That is, the expected 
returns in the long term window can only be roughly estimated, which in turn 
questions the preciseness of the estimates of long-term abnormal returns. Further, 
researchers also challenge the assumption for long-horizon event studies that 
abnormal returns are independent across firms. Over a long time period, major 
corporate activities such as M&As might not be random events; M&As could cluster 
through time by industry (Andrade et al. 2001).  
In addition to the limitations of statistical reliability discussed above, a 
long-horizon window might also capture many other events than the acquisition which 
happen within the same period. In this sense, the CARs will not specifically reflect the 
market expectation on the performance impact of an M&A activity.  
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Given the above concerns with the long-horizon event studies, I use a short event 
window to examine the prompt market response to the event of M&A. In efficient 
capital markets, stock prices should quickly adjust upon the announcement of M&As, 
incorporating any expected value creation or destruction (Andrade et al., 2001).  
I answer my first research question, “whether acquiring firms win or lose from 
cross-border M&As in Asia” by testing the null hypothesis of zero cumulative 
abnormal return at the time period from t1 to t2, for the entire sample and each 
subsample. I test the statistic significance of Patell Z scores. 
The cumulative abnormal return for each security is used as the dependent 
variable when I run the above regression model to investigate the factors that would 
influence acquirer performance. 
 
4.3.2 Ownership advantages 
As the information of R&D and advertising expenses are not attainable for Asian 
acquiring firms, I use intangible assets (IA) to measure acquiring firms’ ownership 
advantages for the test of the entire sample. According to the Financial Reporting 
Standard, companies are required to disclose the value of their intangible assets in the 
balance sheet. Intangible assets in accounting terms refer to the identifiable 
non-monetary assets without physical substance. Common examples of intangible 
assets are patents, copyrights, licenses, brand names and publishing titles, etc. To deal 
with heteroskedasticity problems, I scale the intangible assets by total assets (TA). 
Therefore, I have IA/TA as the proxy for acquiring firm’s ownership advantages.  
For the subsample of U.S. acquiring firms, I also use R&D expense intensity 
(RD/TA) and advertising expense intensity (ADV/TA) as the proxy for ownership 
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advantages to test my hypothesis 1. 
I obtained the relevant information about acquiring firms’ intangible assets from 
CRSP and Worldscope (for U.S. firms). The database of PACAP provides information 
about the acquiring firms from Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
4.3.3 Business relatedness between acquiring and target firm 
The Thomson Financial Database of “Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions” on the 
SDC Platinum provides information about the primary industry code of both acquiring 
and target firm. I use the business description of the 4-digit level SIC code to identify 
whether the core business of an acquiring firm is related to that of the target firm 
(Davis & Duhaime, 1992). In fact, I derived three sets of measures for the business 
relatedness. First, I only create two groups, one for RELATED, the other for 
UNRELATED, based on the detailed business description of the 4-dig SIC. Second, I 
divide the RELATED ones in the first set into two subgroups: HORIZONTAL and 
VERTICAL related M&As. Third, I further subcategorize the related group into six 
different types: SAME BUSINESS, SIMILAR PRODUCTION, SIMILAR CUSTOMER, 
SIMILAR TECHNOLOGY, UPWARD VERTICAL, and DOWNWARD VERTICAL. 
 
4.3.4 Interaction between ownership advantages and business relatedness 
To examine the performance effect of interaction between ownership advantages and 
business relatedness, I derive the variable, INTERACT, by multiplying the “ownership 
advantage” variable by the “relatedness” dummy variable as described below: 











INTERACT_1 is used to test hypothesis 3 for the entire sample and the Asian and U.S. 
subsamples as well. INTERACT_2 and INTERACT_3 are only applied to the test on 
U.S. acquiring firms. 
 
4.3.5 Acquirer’s knowledge about target firm 
Knowledge about target can be measured as whether the acquiring firm holds any 
shares of the target firm prior to the announcement of the M&A. The ownership of 
target equity provides the acquirer a better access to the information of the target firm.  
The SDC Platinum provides information about the percentage of shares owned 
by the acquiring firms prior to the announcement of the M&A. So I use a set of 
dummy variables KNOWLEDGE, to indicate the extent that acquiring firm has 
information about the target firm. KNOWLEDGE_1 is coded as 1 if the acquirer holds 
any share of the target firm, otherwise it is coded as 0. KNOWLEDGE_2 is coded as 1 
if the acquirer holds more than 10%, otherwise it is coded as 0. 
 
4.3.6 Prior acquisition experience 
Prior M&A experience (EXP) is measured in four ways. I construct the first 
“experience” variable, (EXP_1) by counting the number of cross-border M&As 
undertaken in Asia by the acquirer prior to the focal transaction. A squared term of 
this variable (EXP_1_2) is included to examine the potential curvilinear relationship 
between M&A experience and acquirer performance. 
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    I introduce the logarithm of the number of cross-border M&As undertaken 
previously (EXP_2) as the second measure for acquisition experience. A squared term 
for this variable (EXP_2_2) is also used to capture the possible curvilinear 
relationship. 
The third way to measure prior M&A experience is to take the logarithm of the 
length of time between the focal transaction and the first transaction by the acquirer. 
By EXP_3, the length of experience is measured by month; similarly, by EXP_4, the 
length of experience is measured by year.  
I also introduce a dummy variable, EXP_5, to measure the prior acquisition 
experience. It is coded as 1 if the acquirer has any cross-border M&A activity 
undertaken in Asia before the focal transaction; otherwise it is coded as 0. I can use 
this variable to compare it with the results from using other variables of M&A 
experience, and to see whether the intensity of experience (in terms of length), or the 
presence of experience (in terms of yes or no), or both have a significant effect on 
acquirer performance in M&A transactions. 
 
4.3.7 Control variables 
I include six control variables in my regression model. The variable, SIZE, is 
calculated as the logarithm of total assets of the acquirer. PAY is a dummy variable to 
show whether the deal is paid by cash (1=stock, 0=otherwise). The dummy variable, 
NEGO, is coded as 1 if the transaction is completed by private negotiations; otherwise 
it is coded as 0. In addition, I use the variable, CASH FLOW, to control the effect of 
cash constraints. Another variable, LIABILITIES, is established by dividing the total 
long term loan by the total assets. The acquirer’s pre-acquisition PROFITABILITY is 
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also adopted as control variable. Finally, I include the year dummies and country 
dummies to capture the potential impact of specific time period and the impact of 
target nations. I obtain most of the information on which these variables from SDC 
Platinum, with an addition of supplementary information, where required, from CRSP 
and PACAP. 
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS 
In the introduction chapter, I introduced two research questions for this thesis: 1) 
whether acquiring firms win or lose in the cross-border M&As in Asia? 2) What are 
the influential factors on acquirer performance? Accordingly, chapter 3 develops a 
conceptual model and relevant hypotheses for my thesis, and chapter 4 describes the 
sample and variable measures for testing in this study. In this chapter, I try to answer 
the two research questions by reporting the results for a Patell Z test on cumulative 
abnormal returns to the acquiring firms in my study, and the results for OLS 
regressions on the model developed in chapter 3. I not only provide results for the test 
on the entire sample, but also report the results for tests on each subsample which is 
divided according to the country origins of acquiring firms. I will discuss the findings 
in chapter 6.  
 
5.1 Acquirer performance 
In the previous chapter, I described the event study methodology to examine firms’ 
market performance in their M&A activities. Under the null hypothesis of zero 
cumulative abnormal returns at the time period from Day-20 to Day+1, I test the 
statistic significance of Patell Z scores for the entire sample and each subsample. 
 
5.1.1 Z test on the entire sample 
For the entire sample of 314 cross-border M&As by 246 acquiring firms, the average 
cumulative abnormal returns to the acquirers are 0.48 percent, with a z-score of 1.17. 
It shows that acquiring firms earn insignificant abnormal returns from cross-border 
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M&As in Asia. In other words, the shareholders of the acquiring firms do not 
experience significant wealth improvements or wealth destruction in M&As in Asia. 
This result is consistent with the findings by Koh & Lee (1988), and Ding et al. 
(1996). In their study, Ding et al. report an excess return of 0.66 percent, with a 
t-value of 0.78.  
 
5.1.2 Z test on subsamples 
I construct 4 subsamples according to the country origins of the acquiring firms: 
M&As by Hong Kong acquirers; M&As by Singapore acquirers; M&As by U.S. 
acquirers; and M&As by Asian acquirers (combined with Hong Kong and Singapore 
acquirers). Table 5-1 provides the average cumulative abnormal returns (ACARs) and 
z-scores for each subsample. 
We observe that only the U.S. acquirers earn significant, but small positive 
excess returns; but no significant abnormal returns are found among Asia acquirers. 
The results on U.S. part are consistent with Chari, et al. (2004)’s finding of significant 
abnormal returns of 1.65 percent.  
 
5.2 Influential factors of acquirer performance 
I run OLS regressions on the empirical model set up in previous chapters. As I have 
developed three alternative sets of measures for business relatedness, I make three 
groups of tests respectively, by changing the measures for relatedness. Further, I not 
only test my hypotheses on the entire sample, but also run regressions on Asia and 
U.S. subsamples as well.  
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5.2.1 Findings on entire sample 
Table 5-2 displays the results for the tests of all hypotheses on the entire sample. 
Model 1 uses a binary dummy to indicate business relatedness; in Model 2, 
relatedness is categorized into 3 different groups: unrelated, horizontal related, and 
vertical related; Model 3 then provides a more detailed division of business 
relatedness. The signs and significance of the coefficient estimates are mostly 
consistent across these 3 models.  
Hypothesis 1 predicted that an acquiring firm with superior ownership 
advantages would experience better performance through M&As. The positive and 
significant (p<0.05) coefficient estimates on the intangible intensity provides support 
to this hypothesis. I will discuss these results in more detail in the next chapter.  
    Hypothesis 2 made predictions on the relationship between business relatedness 
and acquirer performance. I find statistically significant results to support the 
hypothesis. The positive signs on the measures for relatedness are consistent in Model 
1-3. The regression results indicate that horizontal M&As, especially those sharing 
similar technology are expected to generate more benefits to acquiring firms.  
    Hypothesis 3 predicted that an acquiring firm with superior ownership 
advantages could exhibit better performance if it undertakes a related M&As. 
However, the coefficient estimate on the interaction effect between relatedness and 
intangible intensity is significantly (p<0.05) negative, which is opposite to my 
original prediction. Such a negative sign indicates that intangible asset intensity has a 
less positive, instead of a more positive effect on acquirer performance in a related 
M&A. 
    Hypothesis 4 predicted a positive relationship between acquirer performance and 
acquirer’s knowledge about the target firm. However, the regression findings do not 
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support this hypothesis as the relevant coefficient estimate is not significant from 
zero. 
    Hypothesis 5 predicted that acquiring firms could exhibit better performance as 
they accumulate more organizational acquisition experience. Model 1-3 consistently 
show a significant (p<0.01) U-shape curve of the relationship between acquisition 
experience and acquirer performance. Such a curvilinear relationship indicates that 
acquirer performance would first decline and later increase with the firm’s 
organizational acquisition experience. 
    As for the effects of control variables, first, I find that although the coefficient 
estimate on payment mode is negative, it is not statistically significant, thereby 
providing no support for the argument that acquirers would suffer subnormal returns if 
they pay the deal by stocks instead of by cash. Second, no evidence exists for the idea 
that private negotiations in an M&A transactions could improve acquirer performance. 
Third, the significantly (p<0.10) negative coefficient estimate on acquirer size shows 
that the acquirer performance would be better as acquirer firm size decreases. Fourth, 
the coefficient estimate on cash flow is not statistically significant, providing no 
support for Jensen’s free-cash-flow theory. Fifth, a similar situation also applies to the 
effect of liabilities. The presence of an insignificantly positive coefficient estimate on 
the liabilities does not support the argument that loans by financial institutions could 
better monitor the acquiring firms and thereby improve their performance in M&As. 
Sixth, the acquirer’s pre-acquisition profitability is found to be significantly (p<0.10) 
and positively related to its market performance in M&As. Seventh, acquisitions 
conducted in the year of 1988 appear to suffer subnormal returns for the acquiring 
firms. Finally, the results show that acquirers taking over Hong Kong, China and 
Indonesia firms enjoy more benefits from the acquisition. 
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5.2.2 Findings on Asia acquirers 
Table 5-3 displays the findings of tests on the subsample of cross-border M&As 
undertaken by Asian acquirers, including M&As by Hong Kong and Singapore 
acquiring firms. Similarly, three different sets of measures were used to test the 
hypothesis on business relatedness, and the results are presented in Models 4-6 of 
Table 5-3.  
Comparing the results with the findings on entire sample, we note that most of 
the coefficient estimates for tests on Asia acquiring firms become statistically 
insignificant, except for the effect of business relatedness.  
    First, the effect of ownership advantages and its interaction with relatedness 
become insignificant in the tests on Asia acquirers. When I run a regression on the 
entire sample, I find that ownership advantages measured by intangible assets is 
significantly (p<0.05) positively related to acquirer performance, and its interaction 
with business relatedness has a significantly (p<0.01) negative effect on acquirer 
performance. However, in the subsample of Asia acquirers, these effects become 
insignificant, although their signs remain the same. 
    Second, as the coefficient estimate on acquirer’s knowledge about target firms is 
insignificant in tests on the entire sample, I still do not find in the Asia subsample 
either supportive or contradictory evidence for the relationship between acquirer 
performance and its knowledge about target firms. 
    Third, in the entire sample, I find a significant U-shape curve of the relationship 
between acquisition experience and acquirer performance. However, this curvilinear 
relationship disappears in the subsample of Asia acquirers. I do not find significant 
evidence of relationship between the acquisition experience and acquirer 
performance.  
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   Last, only the positive estimates on relatedness variables remain statistically 
significant in the subsample of Asian acquirers. The regression results show that Asian 
acquirers would enjoy abnormal returns by taking over target firms in related lines, 
especially when the acquiring and target firms are involved in the same business 
sectors or share similar production. 
 
5.2.3 Findings on U.S. acquirers 
Table 5-4 and Table 5-5 display the findings of tests on the U.S. subsample, with 
ownership advantages measured by intangible assets and R&D / advertising 
expenditures respectively. Similarly, I also use different sets of measures for business 
relatedness.  
When I use intangible assets to measure ownership advantages, I only find a 
significantly positive coefficient estimate on the squared term of the variable of prior 
M&A experience. When using R&D / advertising expenditures to measure ownership 
advantages, I find the following significant results: first, a significantly negative, 
instead of positive coefficient estimate on the R&D expenditure (p<0.05). Second, 
related M&As appear to be destructive to the acquirer performance (p<0.05). More 
specifically, I find that shareholders of acquiring firms tend to suffer wealth loss if the 
firm takes over a target firm which shares similar production, or when the firm 
acquires its supplier in Asia. 
Third, I find a significantly positive effect of the interaction between R&D 
expenditure and business relatedness (p<0.05). This result supports my hypothesis 3, 
but contradicts the finding on the entire sample whereby ownership advantages are 
measured by intangible assets. In Chapter 6, I will discuss the findings in more details 
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Fourth, consistent with the findings on the entire sample, the significantly 
positive coefficient estimate on the square term of prior M&A experience indicates a 
U-shape relationship between the acquirer performance and organizational M&A 
experience. I also replace the logarithm measure by using the untransformed term 
(number of M&As); however, I do not find any significant results. 
     
5.3 Summary 
In summary, I use the Patell Z test to investigate whether acquiring firms win or lose 
from their cross-border M&As in Asia, and run OLS regressions to test the hypotheses 
about the influential factors of acquirer performance. 
    Patell Z tests show that on average, acquirers earn insignificant abnormal returns 
from cross-border M&As in Asia. Further, the results for tests on subsamples show 
that only the U.S. acquirers enjoy significantly positive returns of 1.12 percent; 
acquiring firms from Hong Kong and Singapore neither win nor lose significantly 
from M&As.  
    A summary of the hypotheses and empirical findings is listed in Table 5-6. The 
results for OLS regressions on the entire sample provide support for hypothesis 1 
about the positive effect of intangible assets. I also find a significant U-shape 
relationship between acquisition experience and acquirer performance (Hypothesis 5).  
Regression results for the entire sample also show that related M&As are 
expected to generate more benefits for acquiring firms (Hypothesis 2). However, the 
regression findings are contradictory to my original expectation on the interaction 
between ownership advantage and relatedness (Hypothesis 3), that I find the positive 
relationship between intangible assets and acquirer performance would be weakened 
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in related M&As. Finally, I do not find a significant effect of acquirer’s knowledge 
about the target firm on the acquirer performance. I will discuss these findings in 




  - 57 - 
CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
This thesis examines the market performance of acquiring firms in cross-border M&A 
activities in Asia. I present a set of influential factors of acquirer performance by 
identifying not only the elements influencing the benefits generated through M&As, 
but also the factors that determine the cost of M&A investments. By using a sample of 
314 acquisition transactions by 246 acquiring firms in 11 Asian countries, I test five 
hypotheses regarding acquirer performance utilizing an OLS regression model.  
The results support several of the hypotheses. The results show that an acquiring 
firm with superior intangible assets would exhibit better performance in M&As. 
When a firm undertakes an related M&A, the acquirer is expected to enjoy better 
performance. The data also reveal a U-shape relationship between acquisition 
experience and acquirer performance. The cumulative abnormal returns to the 
acquiring firm first decline and later increase with the accumulation of organizational 
acquisition experience.  
However, the study does not provide support for the hypotheses on the effect of 
interaction between intangible assets and relatedness and the effect of acquirer’s 
knowledge about target firm. The significantly negative sign on the interaction effect 
between relatedness and intangible assets is contradictory to my hypothesis 3 which 
predicted that undertaking a related M&A would strengthen the positive effect of 
intangible assets on acquirer performance. In addition, regressions do not find 
significant effect of acquirer’s holding of target’s equity prior to an M&A.  
In the following sections, I analyze these findings in more details, and I complete 
this thesis by discussing its limitations and future research direction. 
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6.1 Ownership advantage & its interaction with business relatedness 
According to the Resource-based view and Foreign Direct Investment theories, 
through cross-border M&As, acquiring firms are able to exploit their specific 
ownership advantages over a larger scale and over a different geographic market, 
thereby enjoying better market performance. Furthermore, ownership advantages 
normally take the forms of superior technological know-how, marketing know-how, 
and management know-how. Such superior knowledge or resources are more specific 
to the businesses in which a firm is involved.  That is, ownership advantages should 
be more easily transferred within related M&As rather than within unrelated ones. 
Therefore, I expected there would be a positive relationship between ownership 
advantages and acquirer performance (Hypothesis 1), and such a relationship would 
be strengthened if the acquirer is conducting a related M&A (Hypothesis 3).  
    The OLS regressions provide mixing findings for the above hypotheses. The 
empirical tests show supportive evidence of the positive impact of intangible assets on 
the acquirer performance. But such a positive relationship is found to be weakened, 
instead of being strengthened, within a related M&A. In order to understand this 
unexpected finding, we need to take the following two factors into consideration: 1) 
the definition of intangible assets; and 2) the interaction between acquirer’s intangible 
assets and the target’s.  
First, in this study, ownership advantages are measured by intangible assets 
which are disclosed in the company’s balance sheet. According to the Financial 
Reporting Standard, intangible assets are the identifiable non-monetary assets 
controlled by the firm, which could generate future economic benefits. Common 
examples of intangible assets are patents, licenses, copyrights, brand names, 
publishing titles and etc. It indicates the overall superior resources that a firm 
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specifically possesses. 
Second, after clarifying the definition of intangible assets, let us look into its 
interaction with business relatedness. I develop my hypothesis 3 by focusing on the 
acquirer characteristics. However, M&A is a business activity with two parties 
involved, both the acquirer and target firm. The contribution of acquirer’s intangible 
assets differs when the acquiring firm is engaged in different relationship with the 
target.  
In related M&As, acquiring firms normally share similar technology, production, 
or markets with the target firms. Consequently, there probably are overlaps in their 
resources, including the intangible assets after the acquisitions. In this sense, the 
combination of intangible assets post acquisition would be less than the sum of their 
stand-alone intangible assets prior to acquisition.  
For instance, in many cases of related M&As, the brand(s) of one merging firm 
would be withdrawn from the markets, which directly influence the re-valuation of the 
intangible assets for this firm. Therefore, for the acquiring firms undertaking related 
M&As, their intangible assets are likely to be revaluated downwards; that is, the 
contribution of the acquirer’s intangible assets on its acquisition performance would 
be weakened in related M&As. 
    In contrast, in unrelated M&As, the acquirer’s intangible assets tend to increase 
in value or at least remain the same. As the acquiring and target firms are operating in 
different businesses, their intangible assets would not offset each other’s due to 
post-acquisition overlaps. The acquirer’s intangible assets would at least not be 
devalued. Further, there might be an amplifying reputation effect through unrelated 
M&As in Asia countries.  
Several of the Asian countries in this study are characterized by some level 
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institution voids for business operations. According to Khanna & Palepu (1997), most 
emerging markets suffer from under-developed communications infrastructure; 
besides, independent consumer-information organizations and consumer redress 
mechanisms are not in place as well. As a result, much higher costs would be induced 
to build up credible brands in such markets. Under such circumstances, MNCs with an 
established reputation would especially enjoy a strong advantage. This reasoning is 
consistent with my finding that acquiring firms with more intangible assets are 
expected to outperform those with less intangible assets through cross-border M&As 
in Asia. 
In line with the above, the acquirer’s established reputation could be leveraged 
over a larger scale and scope in an unrelated acquisition. Under such a circumstance, 
the firm has a greater incentive not to damage its reputation in any of its businesses 
because reputation damage in one business would also impact its other businesses 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997). These two factors could be mutually reinforced. As a result, 
the market would anticipate an upward valuation of the acquirer’s intangible assets in 
unrelated M&As, which means the effect of intangible assets on acquirer performance 
is amplified in unrelated M&As. 
    In the following paragraphs, I discuss the limitations of the measure of intangible 
assets. As in the accounting terms, intangible assets can be accounted only if the 
assets meet the definition and recognition criteria. For example, according to the 
accounting definition, intangible assets must be under the entity’s control. Specific 
management or technical talent is unlikely to meet the definition, although they are 
considered to be ownership advantages. Similarly, a firm may have a portfolio of 
customers or market shares which are expected to continue to trade with the firm. But 
customer relationship or loyalty would not be accounted for intangible assets if there 
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is insufficient control over the expected benefits from such a relationship or loyalty. 
As a result of such differences between the accounting definition and the strategic 
perspective on intangible assets, ownership advantages might be understated by using 
the accounting measure of intangible assets.  
Second, the accounting measure of intangible assets indicates the overall superior 
resources or assets that a firm could leverage, regardless of business relatedness. It 
does not distinguish different types of ownership advantages, i.e. technical knowledge, 
marketing knowledge or management knowledge. To understand the effect of 
different types of ownership advantages, there is a need to develop more specific 
measures for the specific advantages. In the existing research, R&D expenditures and 
advertising expenditures are the most common gauges used to measure technical 
know-how and marketing knowledge. Unfortunately, information about R&D and 
advertising expenditures for the Asian acquirers in my study is not attainable. 
Therefore, for the entire sample, I just use accounting intangible assets to measure the 
ownership advantages.  
For the subsample of U.S acquirers, I run additional regressions by using the 
R&D and advertising expenditures, since the relevant data is available. However, the 
regression findings are contradictory to my expectation. I find that R&D expenditure 
per se is negatively related to the performance of U.S. acquirers; but its interaction 
with business relatedness has a significantly positive impact on the acquirer 
performance. Possible explanations could be as follows. 
R&D expenditure indicates the effort that a firm has contributed to research and 
development activities; it could imply the importance of technical know-how in a firm. 
We may interpret higher R&D expenditure as indicating a firm values technological 
development more; it could be a more technology-oriented firm. If this is true, it 
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would be understandable that the market does not anticipate better performance for 
such a firm to expand its business into Asian markets. Why do the Asian markets 
attract FDI? The most likely answers might be low labor cost and the promising 
consumer market. From this perspective, firms rooted in mature or declining 
industries may consider transferring their production lines to Asian countries where 
the labor cost is much lower and where they expect to expand into a new market. 
Under such circumstances, high technologies might not be the most important 
resources for the acquiring firm to leverage. In other words, if the acquiring firm has 
superior technical strength, its expansion into an Asian market is not expected to be 
consistent with its core business strategy. Further, the lack of research infrastructure 
and poor protection of intellectual properties can be destructive to research and 
development activities in Asian countries.  
However, if we consider the interaction between R&D expenditure and business 
relatedness, I find that the negative effect of R&D expenditure would be mitigated if 
the acquirer takes over a related target firm. This is explainable if we consider a 
related M&A as a basis for the combination of the merging firms’ resources. The 
acquiring firm not only has its superior technical knowledge, but is also able to 
leverage on the target firm’s productive resources and customer relationships. If the 
acquiring firm is undertaking an unrelated M&As, there is no basis for the acquirer to 
combine its superior technology with the target’s production and marketing resources 
to generate operating benefits.   
As discussed above, intangible assets are an overall indicator of a firm’s superior 
ownership advantages. It is expected to be positively related to acquirer performance, 
but such a relationship could be weakened in unrelated M&As. For U.S acquirers, I 
also find that U.S. acquirers with superior R&D strength can enjoy better performance 
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only when they are involved in related M&As. Technical advantage per se is 
negatively related to acquirer performance.  
     
6.2 Related and unrelated M&As 
Whether related or unrelated M&As could generate abnormal returns to acquiring 
firms is another lively topic in the M&A literature. In this thesis, I try to answer this 
question by investigating the effect of business relatedness on acquirer performance. I 
find in my entire sample and Asian subsample, related M&As are expected to 
generate more economic gains for acquiring firms. However, for the U.S. acquirers, I 
find that shareholders of acquiring firms tend to lose from undertaking related M&As.  
In order to explain the findings described above, here I introduce the concept of 
an organizational cultural effect in M&A activities. Post-acquisition integration is a 
challenging and critical process for the acquiring firm to eventually realize the 
potential benefits of an M&A, especially in related M&As. However, some 
researchers have argued that one difficulty in achieving operating synergies arises 
from “organizational inertia”. The generation of synergies in production, R&D, 
marketing, and management requires relevant operational and organizational changes. 
But “organizational inertia” might possibly prevent the focal firms, especially the 
acquiring firms, to make appropriate adjustments.  
Further to this, Sirower (1997, page 40) points out that “the larger problems stem 
from the reshuffling of power and the unwritten expectations of payoffs of 
cooperating versus competing in the course of doing business in the new company”. 
Under such circumstances, effective communication would be especially important as 
it could help to reduce the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the acquisition 
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event; appropriate incentives and reward systems would also help to resolve the 
problem.  
In this sense, it is reasonable to suspect that acquiring firms might encounter 
barriers in communicating core values and implementing core strategies during the 
post-acquisition phase. This difficulty might be most profound for U.S. acquirers as 
they might face more difficulties in the course of post-acquisition integration, 
compared with their Asian counterparts. This would in turn reduce the likelihood of 
realizing the operating benefits from related M&As.  
On the other hand, potential benefits associated with unrelated M&As are 
relatively easier to be obtained. Financial resources are the major ones to be 
transferred within unrelated M&A to generate benefits. There are few constraints on 
the cash reallocation across the business units as these do not involve organizational 
changes, so financial synergies might be achieved with greater ease. Diversification of 
risk is realized once a cross-border unrelated M&A is completed. As a result, financial 
gains can be achieved with greater ease in an unrelated M&A than operating gains in a 
related M&A. Hence, from this perspective, we might be able to understand the 
negative relationship between relatedness and acquirer performance for U.S. acquiring 
firms.  
    With regards to the business relatedness, I would also like to discuss the relevant 
measures. In this thesis, I measure the business relatedness based on the analysis of 
detailed business descriptions of the 4-digit SIC codes (Davis & Duhaime, 1992). 
This approach has its advantages over the approach of directly comparing the 2-digit 
SIC codes.  
First, by analyzing the detailed descriptions, we can avoid over-evaluating the 
relatedness. For example, certain 2-digit SIC categories cover a very broad range of 
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industry lines, and these lines might not necessarily be related to each other. With the 
approach of direct comparison of SIC codes, they would be improperly considered as 
related. In contrast, the detailed business descriptions of SIC codes could help us to 
filter out such incorrect cases. 
By looking into the detailed business descriptions of SIC codes, we are better 
able to capture the potential relatedness between the businesses of the acquirer and 
target. For instance, in my thesis, I establish another two sets of measures for business 
relatedness in addition to the one of “related” vs. “unrelated”: I subcategorize the 
“related group” into 1) two subgroups: “horizontal” & “vertical”; or even more 
detailed, 2) six different types: same sector, similar production, similar customer, 
similar technology, upward-vertical, and downward-vertical. By doing this, we can 
especially capture the vertically related M&As, which could not be identified as 
related by comparing 2-digit SIC codes, as the 2-digit SIC codes for the firms 
involved in vertical M&As are definitely different from each other. The empirical 
tests on these two sets of measures for business relatedness show similar findings that 
the signs on all the relatedness measures are insignificantly positive. 
 
6.3 Acquirer’s knowledge about target prior to the acquisition 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the more knowledge the acquiring firms have about the 
target firms prior to the acquisition, the better the performance the acquirers would 
enjoy through cross-border M&As. I use a dummy variable indicating whether the 
acquirer holds a portion of the target’s equity prior to the acquisition to measure 
acquirer’s knowledge about the target firm. Hence, a positive sign is expected to 
appear on the coefficient of such measure according to the hypothesis 4. However, the 
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finding in this study does not support this hypothesis as the coefficient estimate is not 
statistically significant. 
    In addition to the measure of pre-acquisition ownership, in future studies, we 
could consider some other measures for the understanding/information that acquiring 
firms have about the target. For example, besides the holding of target share, we could 
also look into the previous business relationship between the acquirer and target. If 
prior to the acquisition, the target is the supplier or buyer of the acquiring firm, then it 
would be likely that the acquirer possesses certain information about the target even 
though the acquirer might not hold any equity in the target firm. Such previous 
business history and relationship may facilitate the understanding of target’s business, 
which in turn contributes to the acquirer performance through M&As.  
 
6.4 Organizational acquisition experience 
Hypothesis 5 argues that the performance of the acquiring firm in the cross-border 
M&As would increase as does the accumulation of its acquisition experience. I use 
various measures for acquisition experience (count of acquisitions, logarithm of the 
count number, and logarithm of the length of period between the focal acquisition and 
the first acquisition). The tests on the logarithm measures show a significant U-shape 
relationship between acquirer performance and acquisition experience but the 
untransformed measure does not work in the regression. 
    Using the measure of logarithm of acquisition number, we conclude that the 
acquirer performance would first decline with an increase in the number of 
acquisitions. This could be due to the great challenges presented in the critical 
integration process at the post-acquisition stage. Post-acquisition integration is a very 
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complicated process, which requires considerable management resources (time, 
money and effort). When a firm just starts its acquisition journey, the earliest 
acquisitions could present the firm with many challenges: it might encounter various 
pitfalls in different acquisition activities, and it might be short of management 
resources to cope with such problems, or too many resources would be diverted to the 
acquisition issues, which might affect the development or implementation of other 
important business strategies. As a result, it is possible that the acquirer performance 
declines at the early stage of its acquisition program. 
    However, as the accumulation of relevant experience exceeds a critical point, the 
acquiring firms might be able to benefit from their acquisition experience as they are 
more and more proficient in managing such business activities. They become to know 
how to keep the advantages while avoiding the pitfalls at the same time. The 
management resources could be better allocated and the business could be run in a 
more efficient and productive manner. Therefore, the performance of the acquiring 
firms would enhance with the accumulation of acquisition experience after a certain 
point. 
    The sample in this study includes all the M&A activities that the acquiring firms 
have undertaken in the Asian countries till year 1999. However, it is possible that the 
acquirers have conducted some other acquisitions in markets besides Asia.  
Therefore, it could be likely that the U.S. acquiring firms included in my sample have 
other exposure to the M&As in other markets. Such M&A experience could also be 
exploited when they conduct cross-border M&As in Asian context.  
In future studies, we may also consider distinguishing the different phases of 
M&A activities in the different contexts. Many Asian firms could still be in their 
exploration stage of their acquisition journey; and therefore, they may need a longer 
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period to accumulate sufficient acquisition experience to overcome the downward 
phase. Taking into consideration the different status of M&A stories for the U.S. and 
Asian acquirers, we might find more insightful information about the effect of prior 
M&A experience on acquirer performance. 
 
6.5 Limitations and future research directions 
I try to contribute to the acquisition literature by enriching the theoretical framework 
for identifying the influential effects of acquirer performance, and by meeting the 
empirical needs of testing on the Asian context. That said, there are several limitations 
to my study which require further research attention and exploration. 
    Theoretically, the influential factors I have identified are not comprehensive. In 
this thesis, I propose a framework to identify the influential factors of acquirer 
performance by looking into the elements determining both the benefits and costs of 
acquisition activities. For this framework, I adopt perspectives from Internalization 
Theory, the Resource-based View, Industrial Organization Economics, Finance, and 
Learning Theory. However, the influential factors presented in this thesis are not a 
comprehensive list. We need further exploration to find other potential influential 
factors of acquirer performance.  
One good way for future research to do this is to investigate the interaction 
between acquiring firms and target firms. M&As are business activities that require 
the engagement of two parties. Therefore, the role of both parties and their interaction 
could be crucial to acquisition performance. Unfortunately in this thesis, information 
about target Asian firms is rarely available; hence, I can only focus my analysis on the 
acquiring firms.  
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Another potential avenue for future research is to explore other potential reasons 
for M&As. In this thesis, I have discussed six driving forces for M&As: 1) market 
power, 2) operating efficiency, 3) financial benefits and 4) risk diversification, four of 
which are value-enhancing; and the non-value-enhancing reasons could be 5) hubris 
and 6) managerial discretion. However, there are reasons for cross-border M&As. For 
example, customer benefits may be one motivation for M&As. Firms may undertake 
M&As to jointly deliver products and services; as such integration through 
acquisitions is expected to attract more customers and in turn generate greater 
economic gains. In addition, some cross-border M&As in Asia, especially those 
shortly after 1997, may just be part of “rescue packages” in which the acquirers are 
willing or unwilling but “forced” to add capital to the target firm in order to enhance 
its liquidity. Identifying and understanding the specific reasons for M&As could help 
us to better analyze the acquirer performance and its determinants. 
    Empirically, data accessibility is the largest challenge to M&A research in Asian 
countries. Partly because of this fact, some of the measures adopted in this thesis are 
not ideal as discussed in the previous sections. In future research, we need to develop 
better information on Asian firms, and develop better measures to test for example, 
the effect of ownership advantages and acquirer’s knowledge about target.  
    Finally, mergers and acquisitions are an activity involving very complicated 
business processes, and M&A stories will vary in different firms. Therefore, we need 
other methodologies aside from event studies and an industrial economics approach to 
study this topic. Case studies could be a good tool to understand more about what is 
happening in individual M&As, and case studies might help us to identify other 
critical factors that can influence the performance of an M&A. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
Few studies in the M&A literature have focused on the special context of Asia; I try to 
expand the empirical context for cross-border M&As research by testing five 
hypotheses about the influential factors of acquirer performance based on a sample of 
314 cross-border M&As which were conducted in 11 Asian countries during 
1985-1999. Further, I also try to enrich the list of influential factors of acquirer 
performance by providing a conceptual framework which identifies not only the 
factors that influence the potential value creation within M&As, but also the elements 
determining the total costs of M&A investments as well.  
Academic research on mergers and acquisitions is just as intense and dynamic as 
the M&A activities undertaken in the business world. The M&A stories in Asia are 
receiving more and more attention. Further improvement based on the points 
mentioned in section 6.5, among others, will definitely help to provide more insights 
in the research field of M&A. 
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